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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter under Section 78-
2a-3(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.) 
ISSUE ON APPEAL: DID JUDGE WILKINSON ERR IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, CLAIMS AND 
CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE DEFENDANTS COMMITTED 
MULTIPLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE 
LAWS RESPECTING COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES. 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: The material facts of this case 
are not significantly disputed, therefore the Trial Courts' interpretation of those 
facts become questions of law. Conclusions of law drawn from the Trial Courts' 
interpretations of the facts are reviewed by this Court for correctness and afforded 
no deference. Woodhaven Apt v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918 (Utah 1997); 
Diversified Equities v. American Sav. & Loan, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987) 
and Reed v. Alvey, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). Questions of statutory construction 
are questions of law reviewed by the Appellate Court under a correction of error 
standard. Brown & Root Inds. Service v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 641 
(Utah 1997). When a trial court's rulings are based upon a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different 
result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper 
adjudication under correct principle of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1 
1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v. Nielson, 42 
Utah 157, 129 Pac. 619(1912). 
Preservation of Issue: Plaintiffs complaint alleged that: (a) The 
defendants violated the Utah Motor Vehicle Act ("Motor Vehicle Act") when they 
failed to obtain a salvage title or provide notice of "salvage" as required by law 
(i.e., Count I (R. 5-6)). (b) The defendants violated the Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act, ("Sales Practices Act") when they committed civil and criminal 
violations of the Motor Vehicle Act which constitutes evidence of deceptive and 
unconscionable acts and practices (i.e., Count II (R. 6-7)). (c) And the defendants' 
breaches of their statutory duties constitutes breaches of their fiduciary duties that 
were owed to all subsequent purchasers of the subject motor vehicle by their 
failures to obtain and provide the salvage certificate or provide the notice of 
salvage as required by law (i.e., Count III (R 7)). 
STATUTES INTERPRETATIONS WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE 
AND OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL 
The plaintiff seeks an interpretation and application of the statutes cited 
herein to the facts of his case. The statutes that require interpretation are the Sales 
Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, and the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
("Commercial Code"). These statutes are reproduced in Addendum A to this brief, 
as recognized by Rule 24 Briefs (a) (6) and (11), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure: 
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The Sales Practices Act sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 13-
11-2, 13-11-3 (2) (5) and (6), 13-11-4 (1), (2)(a, b, c, e, j), 13-11-5, 13-11-19 (1), 
(2) and (5) and 13-11-23, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The Motor Vehicle Act sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 41-
la-1001(6)(a), 41-la-1004(2), 41-la-1005(1 )(a)(i), 41-la-1005(l)(d)(i & ii), 41-
la-1005(2), 41-la-1008, 41-3-205 (1, 2, & 3), 41-3-210 (l)(c, d), 41-3-404, 41-3-
701, 41-3-702 (3), (4) & (5), Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The Commercial Code sections requiring interpretation are: Sections 70A-
1-102, 70A-1-201, 70A-1-106, 70A-2-104, 70A-2-313(l) (a & b), 70A-2-313 (2), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case involves Plaintiff/Appellant, James Gordon Holmes, ("plaintiff), 
efforts to recover damages from the Defendants/Appellees, American States 
Insurance Company ("American"), Economy Auto Inc ("Economy")., and 
Clarendon National Insurance Company ("Clarendon") (R 1-10) for their 
negligence, deceptive acts, and illegal practices that breached statutory duties that 
were owed by them to plaintiff regarding commerce in motor vehicles (R. 465-
486, 506-517, 536-551). Defendants' breaches polluted the stream of commerce in 
motor vehicles by means of their sale of a salvage motor vehicle, the salvage 
nature of which was not disclosed (R 465-486, 506-517, 536-551). 
3 
American declared the vehicle that is the subject of these proceedings 
("subject vehicle") a "total loss" salvage, paid over $48,000.00 for a $45,000.00 
vehicle (R 98-114, 233-256, 489-499) and then sold it to Economy for only 
$12,000.00 (R. 119, 157, 236, 308, 317, 526). Economy had full knowledge that 
the subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage motor vehicle when it purchased the 
same (R 92, 93, 98-121, 461-462, 446-450, 503-504, 519, 520, 567-568). 
Economy is a licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer doing business as a 
use motor vehicle dealer in the State of Utah (R 380, 487-488, 534-535, 552-553). 
Clarendon is the bonding company that posted Economy's bond to indemnify those 
who suffer loss by reason of Economy's violation of laws respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles (R. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553). Plaintiff seeks recovery of the 
damages he sustained based upon the defendants' multiple admissions that they 
violated both civil and criminal provisions of the laws respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles (R. 3-8, 157-166, 200, 203-207, 465-499, 505-516, 554-571, 693-
727). 
American's decision that the subject vehicle was a total loss salvage was 
based on its knowledge that the subject vehicle had sustained serious damage from 
a rollover accident and would require over $33,855.00 to properly repair the same 
(R 496, 530, 561). While the subject vehicle was in its damaged condition, during 
the time American held title, plaintiff inquired of American and attempted to 
purchase the vehicle (R. 157-158, 221, 229). During plaintiffs conversations with 
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American, American informed plaintiff that the damage to the subject vehicle did 
not render it a total loss/salvage (R. 500-512, 506-507, 518-522). American did 
not obtain the mandatory salvage certificate of title as required by U.C.A. § 41-1 a-
1005(l)(a)(i). (R. 461-461, 468, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697). 
American sold the subject vehicle to Economy. Both American and 
Economy appear as buyers and sellers on the subject vehicle's title transfer 
documents (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395-387). Following 
Economy's purchase of the subject vehicle, Economy undertook to conceal the 
total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle by illegally selling the same to itself 
through Western Affiliate Salvage Pool (R 383, 395-397, 473, 512, 545, 569-571, 
718). Economy eventually sold the subject vehicle through the Utah Auto Auction 
to Hillcrest Service without disclosing the total loss/salvage to either the Utah 
Auto Auction or Hillcrest Service. Economy likewise failed to obtain the 
mandatory salvage certificate as required by U.C.A. § 41 -1 a-1005(1 )(d)(i & ii). (R. 
383, 396-397, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697). 
While the subject vehicle was under Economy's ownership and control, 
plaintiff contacted Economy and attempted to purchase the subject vehicle from 
Economy. During plaintiffs conversations with Economy, Economy indicated 
that the subject vehicle was not a salvage motor vehicle (R. 157-158, 409-438, 
446-450, 471-472, 519, 717-721). Plaintiffs inspection of the subject vehicle in 
its damaged condition disclosed cosmetic body damage that plaintiff believed he 
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could easily repair.(R. 157, 158, 718-719). Plaintiff eventually purchased the 
subject vehicle from Hillcrest Service with the understanding that the same was a 
damaged, but non-salvage motor vehicle (R. 162, 163, 166, 717-721). 
Plaintiff is not a trained, licensed, or certified automobile collision repair 
person and only makes cosmetic body and fender repair (R. 705, 717-721). Danny 
L. Jenson, a past president of the Utah Automobile Collision Association and 
member of Professional Automobile Alliance testified that it was impossible to 
determine whether the subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage without first 
examining the insurance company's written repair estimate (R. 703-707). 
Alternatively, the subject vehicle would have to be disassembled for inspection of 
its crush, collapse and impact absorbing zones to determine to the extent to which 
the same had been damaged or needed repair (R. 703-707). 
Following plaintiffs purchase he performed cosmetic body and fender 
repairs on the subject vehicle and sought coverage of the manufacturer's warranty 
for other repairs (R. 472, 500-502, 717-721). It was at this point that plaintiff was 
first informed by the vehicle's manufacturer that the subject vehicle was 
"scrapped" "warranty void" and that the same was a total loss/salvage. (R. 472, 
500-502, 717-721, 722-724, 725-727). Plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to 
resolve this matter with American but was forced to bring this action for relief. 
Plaintiff filed tort claims against American and Economy. (R. 1-10, 478, 510-511) 
Plaintiffs tort claims are based on defendants' breach of statutes, 
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misrepresentations and omissions in not obtaining or providing the mandatory 
salvage certificate of title that Utah law requires under U.C.A. §§ 41-la-1005(l)(a 
& d) and 41-1 a-1005(2) (R. 5-6) Count I)). 
Plaintiffs tort claims include claims against defendants for their deceptive 
and unconscionable acts and practices in not disclosing the total loss/salvage 
nature of the subject vehicle and in not otherwise complying with their aforesaid 
statutory duties (R. 6-7, 478, 510-511, (Count II)). Plaintiffs claims are based 
upon the defendants' breaches of their statutory and fiduciary duties that constitute 
prima facie evidence of the defendants' negligence (R 7-8 478, 510-51, (Count 
III)). Defendants never rebutted plaintiffs prima facie case of negligence (R 45-
50, 54-59, 60-65, 478, 510-51, (Count III)). 
Clarendon's liability is premised on Economy's liability for Economy 
violations of laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles (R. 8, 487-488, 534-535, 
552-553 (Count IV)). Plaintiff believes the defendants' failures to act were 
undertaken and carried out with full knowledge that they were violating Utah's 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles so as hide the total loss/salvage and in 
order to obtain a higher resale value of the subject vehicle (R. 5-8). For these 
reason Equitable estoppel (Count V) was asserted (R 5-8). 
The defendants now deny that the subject vehicle was a total loss/Salvage 
and that plaintiff knowingly and willingly purchased the subject vehicle in its 
damaged condition (R. 157-166, 381-384, 409-438, 441-442, 503-504,567-568). 
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The defendants asserted that plaintiff assumed any and all risks concerning the 
subject vehicle in that plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle "as is" (R. 741, 762). 
Finally, defendants assert that there was no privity of contract between them as 
tortfeasors and the plaintiff and that without privity of contract there is no legal 
basis for a tort plaintiff to recover against them (R. 159, 508). 
Plaintiff appeals from the Honorable Homer Wilkinson's Order of Partial 
Summary Judgment, dated June 10, 1999 (R. 645-651, 880-881) and Order Of 
Summary Judgment, dated January 22, 1999 (R. 870-872, 880-881.) 
Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
American's Motion For Summary Judgment, dated October 23, 1997 (R. 
154-155) was opposed on the grounds that defendants had not yet fully responded 
to plaintiffs outstanding discovery. Plaintiffs Second Motion To Compel 
Discovery From American States Insurance Company, Enforcing The Parties 
Agreement, For An Award Of Costs And Attorney's Fees, with accompanying 
Memorandum were filed on October 27, 1997 (R. 167-168, 169-192) together with 
Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Memorandum For Continuance, (R. 193-195, 
196-218). American opposed plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion (R. 269-346). Economy 
and Clarendon thereafter filed Motions and Memorandums for Summary 
Judgment, Or In The Alternative Motion To Join Indispensable Parties Or In The 
Alternative To Amend Defendants Answer To Allege Set Off And/Or Join 
Additional Parties Defendants on February 2, 1998 (R. 376-378, 379-438). 
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Plaintiff attempted to obtain the discover}/ that American's counsel had 
promised but declined to produce (R 196-218, 219-268, 347-351, 352-360). 
Plaintiff also attempted to take the deposition of Economy's principle, Charlie 
Fullmer, which deposition the Judge Wilkinson did not allow, notwithstanding Mr. 
Fullmer having filed an affidavit herein (R. 374-375, 446-450, 451-453, 454-455, 
456-463). Judge Wilkinson also denied plaintiff the opportunity of obtaining 
relevant and needed discovery responses to his discovery requests that had been 
outstanding for nearly 18, months and denied plaintiff the opportunity to depose 
any of the defendants' fact witnesses that were necessary to fully respond to 
defendants' various outstanding motions. (R. 464, 572-574) 
Defendants' motions were argued to Judge Wilkinson on May 14, 1998 (R. 
645.) Judge Wilkinson declined to hear Plaintiffs Notice Of Objections To 
Defendants' Proposed Order Of Partial Summary Judgment, dated May 21, 1998 
(R. 633-641) and entered the Order Of Partial Summary Judgment on June 10, 
1998 (R. 645-651, 654-655). Plaintiffs efforts at obtaining additional discovery 
from the defendants were unsuccessful. On September 18, 1998 American filed its 
second Motion For Summary Judgment (R. 657-658, 659-690). 
Plaintiff was able to obtain independent proof that the subject vehicle was 
in fact a total loss/salvage motor vehicle and that the vehicle's manufacture had 
denied plaintiffs warranty claims (R. 717-724, 725-272). Based on the newly 
discovered evidence, Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum For Reconsideration Of 
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The Court's Order Of Partial Summary Judgment Dated June 10, 1998 was filed 
(R. 693-707, 708-727). American moved to strike plaintiffs newly discovered 
evidence and opposed plaintiffs motion for reconsideration (R. 737-764, 765-770, 
799-840, 841-845). All remaining and outstanding motions were argued to Judge 
Wilkinson on December 29, 1998 (R. 870-872). 
Judge Wilkinson granted the Motions For Summary Judgment (R. 870-872, 
876-877). Plaintiffs' Notice Of Objections To Defendants' Proposed Order Of 
Summary Judgment, (R. 868-869) was duly filed with the Court and served herein. 
On February 22, 1999 plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal (R. 880-991.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The following facts relevant to the issues presented for review are 
established by the record herein. 
1. American is: (a) an insurance company duly licensed and qualified 
to do business in the State of Utah as a motor vehicle insurer (R. 156). (b) a 
"supplier" under and pursuant to the Sales Practices Act U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) (R. 
466). (c) subject to the Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning salvage motor 
vehicles. U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l & 2) (R. 468, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697) and (d) an 
owner/seller of the subject vehicle (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395-
387). 
2. Economy is: (a) a licensed and bonded, used motor vehicle dealer 
with more than 32 years of experience as such in the State of Utah (R. 448, 461, 
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487-488, 534-535, 552-553). (b) a "supplier" under the Sales Practices Act, 
U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) (R. 466-467). (c) a "merchant" under and pursuant to the 
Commercial Code, U.C.A. § 70A-2-104(1) (R. 470). (d) an owner and seller of the 
subject vehicle (R. 115, 116, 161, 163, 251, 308, 332, 395-387). And (e) subject to 
the Motor Vehicle Act's provisions concerning salvage motor vehicles. U.C.A. § 
41-la-1005(l & 2) (R. 383, 396-397, 469, 509, 541, 542, 697). 
3. Clarendon was at all material times herein duly qualified to transact 
business as a surety in the State of Utah (R. 380, 383, 487-488, 534-535). 
Clarendon issued the bond for motor vehicle dealer, which was in full force and 
effect at all material times herein. Clarendon's bond was issued to indemnify 
persons who suffered loss by reason of Economy's violation of laws respecting 
commerce in motor vehicles (R. 3, 8, 380, 440, 466, 487-488, 507-508, 534-535, 
538, 553-553). 
4. The defendants, by means of their business activities and conduct act 
as (a) "suppliers" under the Sales Practices Act, (R. 457, 470, 539, 542, 543) and 
(b) a "merchants" under the Commercial Code (R. 457, 470, 539, 542, 543.) 
5. Plaintiff inquired into, inspected and relied upon defendants' 
representations that the subject vehicle was a non-salvage motor vehicle when he 
purchased the same (R. 157-158, 409-438, 446-450, 471-472, 500-512, 506-507, 
518-522,717-721). 
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6. Notwithstanding the fact that the subject vehicle had been involved 
in a serious accident that resulted in it being a salvage motor vehicle, American 
undertook no effort to obtain the mandatory salvage title certificate required by 
U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(a)(i) (R. 461-461, 468,469, 509, 541, 542, 697). 
7. Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle in its damaged condition and 
caused cosmetic repairs to be made to the same. Following plaintiffs repairs he 
attempted to have additional repairs made under the manufacture's warranty, at 
which time he was informed that the vehicle had been "scrapped" "warranty void" 
and that the subject vehicle did not qualify for manufacturer's warranty protection 
(R. 472, 500-502, 503-504, 722-724, 725-727). 
8. Both American and Economy knew that the subject vehicle was a 
total loss/salvage and failed to so inform plaintiff, Hillcrest Service, or the Utah 
Auto Auction (R. 92, 93, 98-121, 461-462, 446-450, 472, 500-502, 503-504, 519, 
520, 567-568, 722-724, 725-727). 
9. Defendants' refused to correct their action concerning their civil and 
criminal breaches of the Motor Vehicle Act and the duties owed by each of them to 
plaintiff. Defendants' breaches of the laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles 
polluted the stream of commerce with their nondisclosure of the subject vehicle's 
total loss/salvage. As a result plaintiff filed this lawsuit in an effort to obtain the 
remedies provided by law. (R. 1-10). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah has adopted a comprehensive set of laws respecting commerce in 
motor vehicles. The purpose of these laws is to insure, among other things, that 
the stream of commerce in motor vehicle not be polluted with dangerous, defective 
or damaged vehicles that have not been disclosed to the consumer. These laws 
attempt to assure that suppliers, dealers and those regularly engaged in the sale of 
motor vehicles, such as American and Economy, will act responsibly, honestly and 
fairly towards the consuming public. These laws include: 
1. The Motor Vehicle Act. 
2. The Sales Practices Act. 
3. The Uniform Commercial Code, and 
4. The Utah Administrative Code construing the Motor Vehicle Act. 
The Motor Vehicle Act imposes upon each dealer, and those such as 
American who regularly supply dealers with vehicles, the following requirements 
among others: (a) That the dealer be licensed (§ 41-3-201). (b) That the dealer be 
bonded, (§ 41-3-205) by a bond in the form of bond approved by the Utah 
Attorneys' General ("Dealer's Bond") (§ 41-3-205(l)(c)). (c) That the dealer 
fully, fairly and timely disclose to each purchaser all relevant facts concerning the 
physical condition and mileage of each vehicle the dealer sells. (§ 41-3-1310; 
Haynes v. Manning, 917 F.2d 450 452- 453 (10 Cir. 1990). (e) That dealers' deal 
honestly, fairly and in good faith with their customers (§ 41-3-210). (f) That 
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dealers' not commit any fraud, make fraudulent misrepresentation or violate any 
laws, rules or regulations respecting commerce in motor vehicles (§ 41-3-
404(1 )(a)). (g) And that suppliers (i.e., dealers, insurance companies, and 
manufacturers) comply with specific affirmative statutory duties such as disclosure 
of salvage (§ 41-la-1005) and buyback of nonconforming vehicles (§ 41-3-407) or 
be subject to civil and criminal penalties (§§ 41-la-1005(2), 41-3-701 and 41-3-
702) (R. 461-462, 468- 469, 509, 541-542, 697). 
The motor vehicle Act is strengthened by the following provisions: (a) the 
Utah Administrative Code that interprets and underpin parts of the Motor Vehicle 
Act's provisions, (b) the express terms of the required dealer bonds, (c) the terms 
of the Sales Practices Act and (d) the Commercial Code. The Motor Vehicle Act, 
Sales Practices Act and Commercial Code are to be construed broadly to protect 
persons, such as the plaintiff, doing business with those who possess superior 
knowledge, such as Economy and American, in this case. U.C.A. §§ 13-11-3(6), 
41-3-210, 70A-2-104(1) (R. 465-504, 505-535, 536-572). The Dealer Bond's are 
to be liberally construed to protect those doing business with licensed dealers such 
as Economy. Western Sur. Co. v. Redding, 626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981). 
It is significant that the Motor Vehicle Act imposes civil and criminal 
sanctions for its violation (§§ 41-la-1005(2), 31-3-210, 41-3-701, 41-3-702), in 
addition to civil liability (§§ 41-3-702(5) and 41-3-404(1)) (R. 468- 470, 509-510, 
541-542, 697). Breach of one's statutory duty is conduct, of act or omission, 
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which may be treated as negligence without any argument or proof. Such 
violations may be regarded as prima facie evidence of negligence, subject to 
justification or excuse, which defendants never rebutted, justified or attempted to 
excuse in this case. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998) (R. 465-504, 
505-535, 536-571, 578-596, 602-611). 
The Sales Practices Act, covers transactions involving commerce in motor 
vehicles, Wilkinson v. B. & H. Auto, 701 F.Supp. 201 (D. Utah 1989), and renders 
dealers and suppliers, such as insurance companies, liable for unconscionable or 
deceptive acts and practices committed "knowingly or intentionally" (§§ 13-11-4, 
13-11-5, 13-11-19) (R. 468, 479, 483, 484, 540). The Sales Practices Act's 
provides remedies that are in addition to the remedies otherwise available for the 
same conduct under other state laws (§ 13-11-23). 
The Commercial Code imposes upon all parties, particularly merchants, 
obligations of good faith and fair dealing (§ 70A-1-203) as well as duties of being 
honest in fact (§ 70A-1-103). The provisions, purposes and remedies provided 
under the Commercial Code are to be liberally administered to the end that the 
aggrieved party be put in as good a position as if the other parties had fully 
performed (§ 70A-1-106). The Commercial Code imposes high standards of 
conduct on those who possess superior knowledge or skill concerning the product 
being sold. (§70A-2-104) (R. 470-471). Consistent with these statutes, Utah's 
Supreme Court has held in Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) that similar 
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duties are imposed upon salespersons and owners of land to know the conditions 
of their land. The Dugan Court held that circumstances may "impose upon the 
vendor a special duty to know the truth of his representations." 615 P.2d 1245. 
The Court explained the reason as being: 
The reason, of course, is that the parties to a real estate transaction 
do not deal on equal terms. An owner is presumed to know the 
boundaries of this own land, the quantity of his acreage, and the 
amount of water available. If he does not know the correct 
information, he must find out or refrain from making representations 
to unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making a mistake is no 
defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know the facts. 
615 P.2d at 1246 (Citation, quotation marks, and indentation omitted.) The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has reached similar results under federal statutes that 
impose liability on dealers who falsify odometer information with "intent to 
defraud." The Tenth Circuit has held that dealers have affirmative duties to 
discover defects and that an "inference of an intent to defraud is no less 
compelling when a person lacks actual knowledge only by closing his eye to the 
truth." Haynes v. Manning 917 F.2d 450, 453 (10 Cir. 1990) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted.) 49 U.S.C. § 31710(a). 
In Suiter v. Michell Motor Coach Sales Inc., 151 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1998) 
a dealer was not allowed to escape liability by simply relying on the assertions of a 
previous owner. As stated in Haynes, dealers have affirmative duties to discover 
defects. Economy's failure to take any independent steps comply with its statutory 
duties constitutes reckless disregard for the purpose of the motor vehicle act. Suiter 
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151 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). To hold otherwise would strip the Utah's 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles of any meaning. Id. Haynes, Suiter 
and § 13-11-3(6) clearly do away with any requirement that there be privity of 
contract between an injured plaintiff and her tortfeasors. Haynes 917 F.3d at 452; 
Suiter 151 F.3d at 1284-85. An injured tort victim/defrauded car buyer under the 
Motor Vehicle Act or the Sales Practices Act (and other laws respecting commerce 
in motor vehicles) would have no remedy if such victims had to have a contractual 
relationship with their tortfeasor before recovery were allowed. Privity of contract 
is not and never has been a condition to a tort victim's recovery of damages. (R. 
159-160,456-463, 480-481, 515-516, 546-550, 603, 606, 609-610). 
The defendants admit to committing multiple civil and criminal violations 
of the Motor Vehicle Act. Judge Wilkinson totally ignored the defendants' civil 
and criminal misconduct that constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence and 
which may be declared and treated as negligence without argument or proof. 
Child, 972 P.2d at 432. Defendants' civil and criminal violations of the motor 
vehicle act must also establish prima facie evidence of unconscionable acts under 
the Sales Practices Act and the duties imposed upon the defendants under the 
Commercial Code and Dealer's Bond. Defendants' violations of statutes suffice 
for proof of particular facts constituting negligence that the defendants must 
contradict by other evidence. Id. Defendants made no such showing. 
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ARGUMENT 
DID JUDGE WILKINSON ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT, CLAIMS AND CAUSES OF ACTION WHERE 
DEFENDANTS COMMITTED MULTIPLE CIVIL AND 
CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS RESPECTING 
COMMERCE IN MOTOR VEHICLES. 
POINT I 
THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT CONCERNING 
DEFENDANTS' BREACHES OF STATUTES 
Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issues of material fact 
exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Amax v. Tax, 
881 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); citing Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Utah 1990). 
Because summary judgment does not resolve factual issues, a challenge to 
summary judgment presents for review only questions of law. This Court should 
review Judge Wilkinson's findings and conclusions for correctness, according 
Judge Wilkinson no particular deference. Amax, 881 P.2d 943 citing Transamerica 
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); 
accord Mt. Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 887 (Utah 
1988). In determining whether Judge Wilkinson correctly concluded there was no 
genuine issue of material fact, this Court should review the facts and inferences to 
be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing or nonmoving party. 
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Ut. App. 1994); Amax, 881 P.2d 943 citing Hamblin 
v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1990) 
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A. Defendants9 Violations Of The Motor Vehicle Act Established 
Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case Of Negligence 
Plaintiff briefed, argued, re-briefed and reargued his claims to Judge 
Wilkinson that the defendants' breaches of the following statutes constitute 
negligence per se or prima facie evidence of defendants' negligence which 
defendants' did not rebut: 
1. U.C.A. § 41-la-1001(6)(a) defines: 
"Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle: 
(i) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent 
that the costs of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair 
market value; or 
(ii) that has been declared a salvage vehicle by an insurer or other 
state or jurisdiction, but is not precluded from further registration and 
titling. (Emphasis added.) 
2. U.C.A. § 41-la-1004(2) requires: 
"Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded 
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser 
with written notification that a salvage certificate or branded title has 
been issued for the vehicle. 
3. U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(a)(i) requires: 
"If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle and 
takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance company 
pay off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not recovered, the 
insurance company shall within ten days from the settlement of the 
loss surrender to the division the outstanding certificate of title, 
properly endorsed, or other evidence of ownership acceptable to the 
division." (Emphasis added.) 
4. U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(l)(d)(i & ii) requires: 
"(i) If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, 
Licensing, takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is 
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not already issued branded title or salvage certificate from the 
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days 
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of 
ownership acceptable to the division. 
(ii) The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the 
applicant's name. (Emphasis added.) 
5. U.C.A. § 41-la-1005(2) criminalizes the conduct plaintiff complains 
of herein against the defendants: 
"Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41, 
Chapter 3, Part 2 Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate of 
title as required in this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without 
first obtaining a salvage certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
6. U.C.A. § 41-3-702(1-5) imposes civil penalties for violations of the 
salvage notice provisions in addition to the criminal penalties outlined above. 
Specifically: 
"(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal 
violations under section 41-la-1008: 
(b) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled 
to an unbranded title, as defined under Section 41-la-1001 when it is 
not. 
(4) The civil penalty for violation under Subsection (1) is: 
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by 
the person, whichever is greater; and 
(b) reasonable attorney 'sfees and costs of the action. 
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the 
administrator, (emphasis added.) 
7. Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states: 
A. The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at 
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists 
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle. 
B. Written notification that a vehicle has been issued a salvage 
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser 
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on a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division. 
C. The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the 
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title. 
D. The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective 
purchaser and the prospective lien holder\ if any, prior to the sale of 
the vehicle. 
E. If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be 
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side corner of the 
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale. 
F. The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser 
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall 
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of 
sale if the seller is a dealer. (Emphasis added.) 
(R. 465-504, 505-535, 536-572, 602-611, 633-642, 693-707, 708-727, 868-869). 
B. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Case Of Negligence Establishes Prima Facie 
Case Of Violations Of Sales Practices Act 
Plaintiff also briefed, argued, re-briefed and reargued to Judge Wilkinson 
that violations of the aforementioned statutes are per se or prima facie evidence of 
unconscionable acts and practices that violated the following sections of the Sales 
Practices Act: 
1. "Consumer Transaction" as found at § 13-11-3(2) states: 
"Consumer Transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by 
chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, 
services, or other property, both tangible and intangible "(except 
securities and insurance), to a person for primarily personal, family, or 
household purposes, or for purposes that relate to a business 
opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property 
and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not 
been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with 
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or 
solicitation, any agreement, any performance of any agreement with 
respect to any of these transfers or dispositions, and any charitable 
solicitation as defined in this section/' (Emphasis added.) 
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2. U.C.A. § 13-11-3(6) classifies the defendants as suppliers: 
"Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other 
person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer 
transactions, whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
3. Defendants' failures to comply with the requirements of § 41-la-
1005 is prima facie evidence of conduct and acts that are negligent, deceptive and 
unconscionable under § 13-11-4(1) and (2)(a, b, c, e & j). Defendants did not 
factually contest application of these sections to them other than to assert that they 
were not suppliers, in that they did not sell the subject vehicle to plaintiff: 
"(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a 
consumer transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, 
during, or after the transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier 
commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or 
intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject transaction has sponsorship, 
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, use or benefits, if 
has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a 
particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or 
unused, if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially 
different from the fact, 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been 
supplied in accordance with previous representations, if it has not; and 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not 
involve a warranty, disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, 
or other rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false. 
4. Plaintiff also argued to Judge Wilkinson that U.C.A. § 13-11-5(3) 
requires the Court to ". . .consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had 
reason to know" in determining whether the defendants acts or practices 
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complained of were "unconscionable." The facts in this case establish that 
defendants knew that the subject vehicle was a "total loss salvage motor vehicle" 
and that they sold the same without any attempt to comply with the Motor Vehicle 
Act's affirmative duties and requirements concerning notice of salvage. (R. 156-
166, 169-192, 196-218, 219-268, 347-351, 379-438, 439-445, 446-450, 465-504, 
505-535, 536-572, 602-611, 615-617, 633-642, 659-690, 693-707, 708-727, 737-
762, 765-770, 771-782, 785-792, 793-795, 868-869). 
C. Plaintiffs Prima Facie Showing Of Negligence Established Commercial 
Code Violations 
The Commercial Code's provisions and multiple references to "good faith," 
(§§ 70A-1-102(3), 70A-1-201(19), 70A-1-203, 70A-2-103(l)(b)) demonstrate an 
unwavering duty that "honesty in fact" in ones conduct and observance of 
reasonable and fair dealings be maintained. One's obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care may not be disclaimed or avoided. Utah has 
long recognized that a seller, whether he or she is a "merchant" (§ 70A-2-104), a 
"supplier" (§ 13-11-3(6)), or a "dealer" (§ 41-la-102(13) & 41-3-102(8)), is 
presumed to know the material facts concerning that which it is that he or she sells. 
Howe v. Michelson, 225 P.2d 735 (Utah 1951). The Commercial Code allows no 
more than a slight or unimportant variation from what is specified or described by 
the seller and what is actually delivered. Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188 
(1885). 
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Legislative and judicial abandonment of the doctrine of caveat emptor is 
consistent with the changes in the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act and 
other provisions of the Commercial Code. U.C.A. § 70A-313(a) and (b) 
specifically does away with "buyer beware" by making affirmations of fact and 
descriptions that become a part of the basis of the bargain express warranties that 
the goods will conform with the affirmations or promises. The doctrine of caveat 
emptor is also incompatible with prevailing trends in consumer law, product's 
liability law, and the law of torts. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Utah 1991); 
WoodhavenApts v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997). 
Of particular concern to plaintiff and his claims are the defendants' 
admissions that they violated multiple provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. The 
plaintiff contends that the Motor Vehicle Act recognizes and provides him with a 
remedy for defendants' breaches of the same which are also breaches of warranty. 
The defendants breached their duties of good faith, honesty in fact, 
diligence, reasonableness, care, due diligence, duty to supply goods that conformed 
to their representations, and engaged in deceptive and unconscionable conduct in 
selling the subject vehicle and placing it back into the stream of commerce. The 
Commercial Code exacts higher standards from those "who deal in goods of the 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction" (§ 70A-2-104(1)). 
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§ 70A-2-313(l) and (2) outline the express warranties that defendants 
created when they allowed the subject vehicle back into the sream of commerce 
without disclosing the total loss/salvage. § 70A-2-313(l) recognize that "any 
affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the 
goods and becomes a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty 
that the goods shall conform." Subsection (2) recognizes that it "is not necessary 
to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as 
'warrant' or 'guarantee' or that he have a specific intent to make a warranty...." 
A positive affirmation of fact that tends to induce a bargain is a warranty 
and the fact that the seller did not intend to warrant is no defense. Park v. 
Moorman Mtg. Co., 241 P.2d 914, 917 (Utah 1952); Studebaker v. Bros. Co. v. 
Anderson 167 Pac. 663 (Utah 1917). Oral representations of fact are recognized in 
other jurisdictions as warranties as well and not as "mere puffing." See Chrysler -
Plymouth City Inc. v. Guerrero, 620 SW 2d 700 (Tex Civ. App. 4th Dist. 1981). In 
Hackett v. Lewis, 173 Pac. I l l (Cal. App. 1918), the court held to the simple 
principle that any distinct assertion made by the seller and intended to be relied 
upon to induce a purchase is a warranty. 
Even a representation made after a sale, to promote the sale by inviting 
reliance respecting the thing sold may be actionable as express warranties. Downie 
v. Abex Corp., 741 F.2d 1235 (10th Cir. 1984). Defendants' refusal to inform 
25 
plaintiffs of the true status of the subject vehicle's total loss/salvage breached the 
express warranties that induced plaintiffs purchase of the subject vehicle. 
Whether an affirmation of fact, a promise, or a description of the goods is a 
warranty is determined by what a reasonable person would have taken from the 
statement. State of Utah, By Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAFF Corp.. 760 
P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). An express warranty is created when a reasonable person 
would have entered into the transaction based on the particular statement. Id, 3 R. 
Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-313:50 at 40 (3d Id. 
1983). Actual reliance need not be shown, as in this case, only that the statement 
formed a "part of the bargain." § 70A-2-313, Jensen v. Seigel Mobil Homes 
Group, 668 P.2d 65, 71 (Idaho 1983), Autzen v. John C Taylor Lumber Sales, 572 
P.2d 1322, 1324-25 (Oregon 1977). 
The undisputed facts are that defendants did not disclose the salvage. The 
nondisclosure has civil and criminal repercussions and plaintiff is entitled to 
recover the damages provided by law for plaintiff would not have purchased a 
salvage motor vehicle had he known of the salvage. (R. 720). 
D. Interpretation And Application Of Statutes To The Facts Of This Case 
In Child 972 P.2d at 432, the Utah Supreme Court clarified the difference 
between "per se" negligence and "prima facie" evidence of negligence. Negligence 
per se usually results from a violation of a statute and is defined as: 
26 
"[c]onduct, whether of act or omission, which may be declared and 
treated as negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular 
circumstances . . ."Black's Law Dictionary 1035 (6th Ed. 1990) 
By comparison, prima facie evidence of negligence is recognized and defined as: 
"[t]hat quantum of evidence that suffices for proof of a particular fact 
until the fact is contradicted by other evidence; once the trier of fact 
faced with conflicting evidence, it must weigh the prima facie evidence 
with all of the other probative evidence presented. 
Gaw v. State, 798 at 1135 (Utah 1990). In this case, plaintiff presented evidence 
of defendants' civil and criminal violations of the Motor Vehicle Act and other 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. Plaintiff prima facie showing of 
defendants' negligence precluded Judge Wilkinson from granting defendants' 
motions for summary judgment as a matter of law. Child, 972 P.2d at 432. 
The prima facie evidence of negligence was evidence that was sufficient to 
submit the question of defendants' negligence to the jury, and would have 
supported a verdict of negligence. Id, at 432. Judge Wilkinson's granting 
defendants' summary judgment was highly improper, contrary to the Child 
standard, and ignores the mandate that Judge Wilkinson make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Where evidence was 
presented that statutes were violated, it was strictly within the providence of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and determine whether or not to believe the defendants 
proffered explanation for violating the law or find in favor for plaintiff. Id. at 432. 
Amax 881 P.2d 943 (Tutah 1993); citing Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d at 
25; accord Mt. Fuel Supply Co., 752 P.2d at 887 (Utah 1988). 
27 
Where Judge Wilkinson's rulings were based upon a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have produced a different 
result, plaintiff is entitled to have the error rectified in a proper adjudication under 
correct principles of law. Reed v. Avery, 616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. 
Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 
619(1912). 
Defendants did not present any contrary evidence to plaintiffs prima facie 
case. Instead defendants claimed that the subject vehicle was not salvage, that 
there was no privity of contract, that they were not sellers/suppliers and that the 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles did not apply to them (R. 156-160, 
379-397, 447-449). 
Plaintiffs expert Danny L. Jenson testified that an untrained, uncertified 
and inexperienced persons, such as plaintiff, are not capable or qualified to know 
when a motor vehicle has been declared a total loss/salvage based on a visual 
inspection. (R. 705). Mr. Jenson also testified that today's vehicles require 
extensive knowledge, training and experience before their crash, crush and impact 
absorbing areas can be properly evaluated and repaired (R. 705). 
It was the expert's opinion that the only way to determine whether the 
subject vehicle was a total loss/salvage was to review American's documents prior 
to purchase or have the vehicle disassembled (R. 705-706). And it was the 
expert's opinion that the subject vehicle was a salvage motor vehicle requiring a 
28 
branded title that the defendants knew was required but never applied for or 
obtained (R. 706). 
The Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the Commercial Code, and 
Economy's bond should be construed for the purpose of keeping Utah law 
consistent with federal and sister states' consumer protection standards. In the 
absence of any language to the contrary, these Acts should be construed in a 
manner consistent with that given similar federal and sister states laws. U.C.A. §§ 
13-11-2, 70A-1-102(2). 
The statutes cited herein and the dealer's bonds are to be liberally and 
broadly construed. U.C.A. §§ 13-11-2, 70A-1-106, Western Sur. Co. v. Redding, 
626 P.2d 437 (Utah 1981) (This section should be construed broadly to protect 
persons doing business with motor vehicle dealers.) The intent and purpose of 
these laws is to protect consumers and require suppliers to abandon use of 
deceptive and unconscionable practices. Economy's dealer bond provides that it 
will indemnify those who might suffer loss by reason of Economy's violation of 
laws respecting commerce in motor vehicles. The dealer bond states: 
"...if the above bounded principal . . . shall well and truly observe and 
comply with all requirements and provisions of THE ACT PROVIDING 
FOR THE REGULATION AND CONTROL OF THE BUSINESS OF 
DEALING IN MOTOR VEHICLES, as provided by Chapter 3, Title 41, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), and indemnify persons, firms and 
corporations in accordance with Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended), for loss suffered by reason of the fraud or fraudulent 
representations made or through the violation of any of the provisions of 
Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), or any law 
respecting commerce in motor vehicles or rule respecting commerce in 
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motor vehicles promulgated by a licensing or regulating authority so that 
the total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims 
may not exceed $20,000.00 , as set forth in Chapter 3, Title 41, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953, as amended) on account of fraud or fraudulent 
representations or for any violation or violations of said laws or rules 
during the time of said license and all renewals thereof then the above 
obligation shall be null and void, otherwise to remain in full force and 
effect. Said bonded Principal shall also pay reasonable attorney's fees in 
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principle if the 
bond has not been depleted" 
(Emphasis added)(R. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553) (Addendum B.) 
Contrary to Judge Wilkinson's two rulings that interpreted the acts in 
question, plaintiff is entitled to a remedy, for the acts themselves must be 
construed as providing an individual right of action. When one suffers a loss, 
particularly a consumer, due to a fraud, fraudulent representations or violation of 
any law, rule or regulation respecting commerce in motor in motor vehicles, the 
consumer must be protected and allowed a remedy against the tortfeasor or 
dealer's surety. Betenson v. Call Auto Equip. Sales Inc., 645 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1982). 
The legislature has given consumers additional protections by granting to 
those consumers who must pursue a remedy in court the right to recover the 
consumer's costs and attorneys fees as a matter of law (§§ 13-11-19(5), 41-3-
205(3) and 41-3-702 (4)(b)). The Dealer's Bond at issue in these proceedings 
expressly provides that the "Principal shall also pay reasonable attorneys' fees in 
cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the Surety or Principal if the bond 
has not been depleted." (R.. 487-488, 534-535, 552-553.) 
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The statutes providing for minimal damages (§§ 13-11-19(2), 41-3-702(4)), 
actual damages (§ 13-11-19(2)), or treble damages (§ 41-3-702(4)) in addition to 
costs and attorneys fees thus making the litigation of consumer protection claims a 
matter of public interest. Judge Wilkinson erred in dismissing plaintiffs claims 
under the Commercial Code for the defendants' breaches of express/implied 
warranty. Whether or not plaintiff acted as a reasonable person when he relied 
upon the defendants' representations was a question for the jury to decide not 
Judge Wilkinson. 
It is simply bad law to hold that once a buyer buys, it is assumed that he 
knew what he was buying. Baker v. Latser, 206 Pac. 553 (Utah 1922); Official 
Comment No. 9 to §70A-2-315. Utah has long recognized that a party may 
justifiably rely on positive representations of fact without an independent 
investigation. Id. Conder v. Williams 739 P.2d 634, 638 (Utah App. 1987). 
Today's motor vehicles are too sophisticated and complex and are too difficult and 
expensive to maintain and in many instances require particular expertise, special 
education and specialized tools to properly inspect, diagnose, maintain, or repair 
them. (R. 703-707). It is contrary to the authority cited to hold that a buyer is 
presumed to be on equal footing with the merchant/supplier when he buys. 
Judge Wilkinson ignored the Commercial Code's non-waivable inescapable 
duties. The defendants, who had more knowledge than anyone concerning the 
subject vehicle, were rewarded by Judge Wilkinson for their nondisclosure. As 
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merchants/suppliers they did not have the right or privilege to use their superior 
knowledge and skill to hide the material facts concerning the total loss/salvage 
condition the subject vehicle was in when they sold it. Such conduct is prima facie 
evidence of unconscionablity and under Child a question that the jury should have 
decided. As such, Judge Wilkinson's summary judgment was improper. 
E. Judge Wilkinson Erred When He Denied Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion, 
Prevented Plaintiff From Deposing Defendants' Fact Witnesses, Failed To 
Compel Defendants' To Answer Plaintiffs Discovery Requests And Granted 
Defendants' Motions Based On The Court's Own Factual Findings 
Plaintiff was denied the right to be provided by the defendants with 
appropriate and meaningful responses to plaintiffs discovery requests. Plaintiff 
was denied the right to depose defendants' fact witnesses and he was denied the 
right to obtain responses directed toward the discovery of facts that were highly 
relevant to the issues raised by the pleadings. In addition, plaintiff was precluded 
from having material fact issues decided by the jury as the fact finder. Instead, 
Judge Wilkinson improperly acted as the fact finder in granting defendants' 
motions. (R. 633-642, 868-869) Because summary judgment by definition does 
not resolve factual issues, it was plain error for Judge Wilkinson to find that 
plaintiff knew he was buying salvage, that he was not misled, that he was not 
misrepresented to by the defendants, and that he had buyer's remorse. (Addendum 
B. page 33). (R. 633-641, 868-869.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Judge Wilkinson, notwithstanding the defendants' admitted multiple 
violations of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, the Sales Practices Act and 
the Commercial Code, granted the defendants' summary judgment motions with 
respect to all of plaintiffs claims based upon such violations. The defendants 
violated these provisions knowingly and intentionally thereby enabling them to 
hide and conceal the total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle. The 
defendants polluted the stream of commerce in motor vehicles by their non-
disclosure of the total loss/salvage nature of the subject vehicle that plaintiffs 
ultimately purchased at a significantly inflated price and in a seriously unsafe 
condition. The safeguards intended by the legislature to preclude the kind of 
conduct in which the defendants' engaged in their dealings has been subverted and 
rendered wholly ineffective. 
This Court should rule: (A) That the defendants had a positive non-
abandonable legal duty to disclose the total loss/salvage condition of the subject 
vehicle at the time it was sold, and to honestly, fully, fairly and timely advise 
plaintiff of all relevant facts concerning such condition. (B) That plaintiff is 
entitled to pursue each and all of the rights and remedies which are expressly 
afforded him by the Sales Practices Act, the Motor Vehicle Act, the Commercial 
Code, the Utah Administrative Code, and the Dealer's Bond based on his prima 
facie showing of negligence. (C) That Judge Wilkinson's finding of facts and 
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award of costs was in error. And (D) that the aforementioned Acts are to be 
construed liberally and broadly in plaintiffs favor to insure that the rights and 
remedies of plaintiff as a member of the consuming public are safe guarded and 
rendered effective and meaningful. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this , f (lay of September, 1999. 
MSA*//:SP^ s'' < ,
ynJi^'\ 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was served upon the following individual by mailing a copy thereof, postage 
prepaid, to said individual at the following address this cr^ day of September, 
1999. 
Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for American 
6TH Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
A. W. Lauritzen 
Attorney for Economy & Clarendon 
610 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
.s^s^ -*-, r • C ' 1 . * / ^ 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE AND OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL: 
Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act: 
13-11-2, Construction and purposes of act. 
This act shall be construed liberally to promote the following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing consumer 
sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit deceptive and 
unconscionable sales practices; 
(3) to encourage the development of fair consumer sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales practices not 
inconsistent with the policies of the Federal Trade Commission Act relating 
to consumer protection; 
(5) to make uniform the law, including the administrative rules, with 
respect to the subject of this act among those states which enact similar 
laws; and 
(6) to recognize and protect suppliers who in good faith comply 
with the provisions of this act. 
13-11-3. Definitions. 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award 
by chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or 
other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance), to 
a person for primarily personal, family, or household purposes, or for purposes 
that relate to a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money 
or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has 
not been previously engaged, or a solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect 
to any of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any offer or solicitation, any 
agreement, any performance of an agreement with respect to any of these 
transfers or dispositions, and any charitable solicitation as defined in this section. 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, government, 
governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, 
association, cooperative, or any other legal entity. 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or 
other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, 
whether or not he deals directly with the consumer. 
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13-11-4. Deceptive act or practice by supplier. 
(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in connection with a consumer 
transaction violates this chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a supplier commits a 
deceptive act or practice if the supplier knowingly or intentionally: 
(a) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has sponsorship, 
approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses, or benefits, if it 
has not; 
(b) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a particular 
standard, quality, grade, style, or model, if it is not; 
(c) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction is new, or unused, 
if it is not, or has been used to an extent that is materially different from the 
fact; 
(e) indicates that the subject of a consumer transaction has been supplied 
in accordance with a previous representation, if it has not; 
(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves or does not involve a 
warranty, a disclaimer of warranties, particular warranty terms, or other 
rights, remedies, or obligations, if the representation is false; 
13-11-5. Unconscionable act or practice by supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier in connection with a 
consumer transaction violates this act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question of law for the 
court. If it is claimed or appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court 
shall consider circumstances which the supplier knew or had reason to know. 
13-11-19. Actions by consumer. 
(1) Whether he seeks or is entitled to damages or otherwise has an 
adequate remedy at law, a consumer may bring an action to: 
(a) obtain a declaratory judgment that an act or practice violates this 
chapter; and 
(b) enjoin, in accordance with the principles of equity, a supplier who has 
violated, is violating, or is likely to violate this chapter. 
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(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a violation of this chapter 
may recover, but not in a class action, actual damage or $2,000, whichever is 
greater, plus court costs. 
(5) Except for services performed by the enforcing authority, the court may 
award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee limited to the work 
reasonably performed if: 
(a) the consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this 
chapter has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless; or a 
supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this chapter; and 
(b) an action under this section has been terminated by a judgment or 
required by the court to be settled under Subsection 13-11-21 (l)(a). 
13-11-23- Other remedies available—Class action only as prescribed by 
act. 
The remedies of this act are in addition to remedies otherwise available for 
the same conduct under state or local law, except that a class action relating to a 
transaction governed by this act may be brought only as prescribed by this act. 
Utah Motor Vehicle Dealer Act: 
41-la-1001. Definitions 
(6) "Salvage vehicle" means any vehicle: 
(a) damaged by collision, flood, or other occurrence to the extent 
that the cost of repairing the vehicle for safe operation exceeds its fair 
market value; or 
41-la-1004. Certificate of title - Salvage vehicles 
(2) Before the sale of a vehicle for which a salvage certificate or branded 
title has been issued, the seller shall provide the prospective purchaser with written 
notification that a salvage certificate or a branded title has been issued for the 
vehicle. 
41-la-1005. Salvage vehicle - Declaration by insurance company -
Surrender of title - Salvage certificate of title. 
(1) (a) (i) If an insurance company declares a vehicle a salvage vehicle 
and takes possession of the vehicle for disposal, or an insurance 
company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen and not 
recovered, the insurance company shall within tern days from the 
settlement of the loss surrender to the division the outstanding 
certificate of title, properly endorsed, or other evidence of 
ownership acceptable to the division, 
(d) (i) If a dealer licensed under Title 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, 
takes possession of any salvage vehicle for which there is not 
already issued a branded title or salvage certificate from the 
division or another jurisdiction, the dealer shall within ten days 
surrender to the division the certificate of title or other evidence of 
ownership acceptable to the division, 
(ii) The division shall then issue a salvage certificate in the 
applicant's name. 
(2) Any person, insurance company, or dealer licensed under Title 41, 
Chapter 3, Part 2, Licensing, who fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in 
this section or who sells a salvage vehicle without first obtaining a salvage 
certificate is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
41-la-1008. Criminal penalty for violation. 
It is a class A misdemeanor to knowingly violate Sections 41-la-1001 
through 41-la-1007, unless another penalty is specifically provided. 
41-3-205, Licenses—Bonds required—Maximum liability—Action against 
surety— 
(1) (a) Before a dealer's, special equipment dealer's, crusher's, or body 
shop's license is issued the applicant shall file with the administrator a 
corporate surety bond in the amount of: 
(i) $20,000 for a motor vehicle dealer's license or special 
equipment dealer's license; 
(ii) $1,000 for a motorcycle or small trailer dealer's or crusher's 
license; or 
(iii) $10,000 for a body shop's license. 
(b) The corporate surety shall be licensed to do business within the 
state. 
(c) The form of the bond: 
(i) shall be approved by the attorney general; 
(ii) shall be conditioned upon the applicant's conducting business 
as a dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation and without 
violating this chapter; and 
(iii) may be continuous in form. 
(d) The total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons 
making claims may not exceed the amount of the bond. 
(2) A cause of action under Subsection (1) may not be maintained 
against a surety unless: 
(a) a claim is filed in writing with the administrator within one year 
after the cause of action arose; and 
(b) the action is commenced within two years after the claim was 
filed with the administrator. 
(3) A person making a claim on the bond shall be awarded attorneys' fees 
in cases successfully prosecuted or settled against the surety or principal if the 
bond has not been depleted. 
41-3-210. License holders—Prohibitions. 
(1) The holder of any license issued under this chapter may not: 
(c) violate this chapter or the rules made by the administrator; 
(d) violate any law of the state respecting commerce in motor 
vehicles of any rule respecting commerce in motor vehicles made by 
any licensing or regulating authority of the state. 
41-3-404. Right of action against dealer, salesperson, crusher, body shop, or 
surety on bond. 
(1) A person may maintain an action against a dealer, crusher, or body ship 
on the corporate surety bond if: 
(a) the person suffers a loss or damage because of: 
(i) fraud; 
(ii) fraudulent representation; or 
(iii) a violation of: 
(A) this chapter; 
(B) any law respecting commerce in motor vehicles; or 
(C) a rule respecting commerce in motor vehicle made by a 
licensing or regulating authority; and 
(b) the loss or damage results from the action of: 
(i) a licensed dealer; 
(ii) a licensed dealer's salesperson action on behalf of the dealer or 
within the scope of the salesperson's employment; 
(iii) a licensed crusher; or 
(iv) a body shop. 
(2) Successive recovery against a surety on a bond is permitted, but the 
total aggregate annual liability on the bond to all persons making claims may not 
exceed the amount of the bond. 
(3) A cause of action may not be maintained against any surety under any 
bond required under this chapter except as provided in Section 41-3-205. 
41-3-701. Violations as misdemeanors. 
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(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter any person who violates 
this chapter or any rule made by the administrator is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who violates Section 41-3-201 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) A person who violates Section 41-3-301 is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor unless the selling dealer complies with the requirements of Section 
41-3-403. 
41-3-702. Civil penalty for violation. 
(3) The following are civil violations in addition to criminal violations 
under Section 41-la-1008: 
(a) knowingly selling a salvage vehicle, as defined in Section 41-la-
1001, without disclosing that the salvage vehicle has been repaired or 
rebuilt; 
(b) knowingly making a false statement on a vehicle damage disclosure 
statement, as defiled in Section 41-la-1001; or 
(c) fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle is entitled to 
an unbranded title, as defined in Section 41-la-l001, when it is not. 
(4) The civil penalty for a violation under Subsection (1) is: 
(a) not less than $1,000, or treble the actual damages caused by the 
person, whichever is greater; and 
(b) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action. 
(5) A civil action may be maintained by a purchaser or by the 
administrator. 
Utah Administrative Code R873-22M-25 states: 
A. The Motor Vehicle Division shall brand a vehicle's title if, at 
the time of initial registration or transfer or ownership, evidence exists 
that the vehicle is a salvage vehicle. 
B. Written notification that a vehicle has been issued a salvage 
certificate or branded title shall be made to a prospective purchaser on 
a form approved by the Administrator of the Motor Vehicle 
Enforcement Division. 
C. The form must clearly and conspicuously disclose that the 
vehicle has been issued a salvage certificate or branded title. 
D. The form must be presented to and signed by the prospective 
purchaser and the prospective lien holder, if any, prior to the sale of 
the vehicle. 
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E. If the seller of the vehicle is a dealer, the form must be 
prominently displayed in the lower passenger-side corner of the 
windshield for the period of time the vehicle is on display for sale. 
F. The original disclosure form shall be given to the purchaser 
and a copy shall be given to the new lienholder, if any. A copy shall 
be kept on file by the seller for a period of three years from the date of 
sale if the seller is a dealer..) 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code: 
70A-1-102. Purposes—Rules of construction—Variation by agreement. 
(1) This act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act are 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 
(3) The effect of provisions of this act may be varied by agreement, except 
as otherwise provided in this act and except that the obligations of good faith, 
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this act may not be disclaimed by 
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the 
performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not 
manifestly unreasonable. 
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this act of the words "unless 
otherwise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of 
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under Subsection (3). 
(5) In this act unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural 
include the singular; 
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the 
neuter, and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may 
refer to any gender. 
70A-1-103. Supplementary general principles of law applicable. 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this act, the principles of 
law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to 
contract, principal and agent, estoppel fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its 
provisions. 
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70A-1-106. Remedies to be liberally administered. 
(1) The remedies provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the 
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party 
had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may 
be had except as specifically provided in this act or by other rule of law. 
(2) Any right or obligation declared by this act is enforceable by action 
unless the provision declaring it specifies a different and limited effect. 
70A-1-201. General definitions. 
(3) "Agreement" means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances including course 
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in 
Sections 70A-1-205 and 70A-2-208. Whether an agreement has legal 
consequences is determined by the provisions of this title, if applicable; 
otherwise by the law of contracts as provided in Section 70A-1-103. 
Compare the definition of "contract" in Subsection (11). 
(11) "Contract" means the total legal obligation which results from 
the parties' agreement as affected by this title and any other applicable rules 
of law. Compare the definition of "agreement" in Subsection (3). 
(15) "Document of title" includes bill of lading, dock warrant, dock 
receipt, warehouse receipt, or order for the delivery of goods, and also any 
other document which in the regular course of business or financing is 
treated as adequately representing that the person in possession of it is 
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it 
covers. To be a document of title, a document must purport to be issued by 
or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover goods in the bailee's 
possession which are either identified or are fungible portions of an 
identified mass. 
(19) "Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned. 
70A-1-203. Obligation of good faith. 
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of good faith in 
its performance or enforcement. 
70A-2-103. Definitions and index of definitions. 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires 
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods. 
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact and the 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
the trade. 
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods. 
70A-2-104. Definitions—"Merchant"- " Between merchants"- "Financing 
agency." 
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or 
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such 
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or 
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such 
knowledge or skill. 
(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other person 
who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against goods or 
documents of title or who by arrangement with either the seller or the buyer 
intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect payment due or claimed under the 
contract for sale, as by purchasing or paying the seller's draft or making advances 
against it or by merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title 
accompany the draft. Financing agency" includes also a bank or other person who 
similarly intervenes between persons who are in the position of seller and buyer in 
respect to the goods (Section 701-2-707). 
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to which 
both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of merchants. 
70A-2-105. Definitions—"Goods" 
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured goods) 
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than 
the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (chapter 8) and 
things in action. 
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest in them 
can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified are "future" goods. A 
purported present sale of future goods or of any interest therein operates as a 
contract to sell. 
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified goods. 
70A-2-106. Definitions—"Contract"—"Agreement"—"Contract for sale"— 
"Sale"—"Present sale"—"Conforming" to contract— 
"Termination"- "Cancellation." 
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires "contract" and 
"agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future sale of goods. 
9 
"Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell 
goods at a future time. A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to 
the buyer for a price (Section 70A-2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is 
accomplished by the making of the contract. 
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are 
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accordance with the 
obligations under the contract. 
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by 
agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach. On 
"termination" all obligations which are still executory on both sides are discharged 
but any right based on prior breach or performance survives. 
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the contract for 
breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of "termination" except that 
the canceling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or any 
unperformed balance. 
70A-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause. 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the 
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse 
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. 
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to 
aid the court in making the determination. 
70A-2-312. Warranty of title and against infringement - Buyer's obligation 
against infringement. 
(2) A warranty under Subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only by 
specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that 
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to sell 
only such right or title as he or a third person may have. 
70A-2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the 
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the 
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bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to 
the description. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller 
use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods 
or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the 
goods does not create a warranty. 
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ADDENDUM B 
PORTIONS OF RECORD ON APPEAL OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO 
THE COURT'S DETERMINATION 
1. Transcript Of Hearing On Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, 
dated May 14,1998 1-46 
2. Bond Of Motor Vehicle Dealer, Salesperson, Or Crusher, 


























IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
JAMES GORDON HOLMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Case No. 970900877 CV 
HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' 




BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 14th day of May, 
1998, commencing at the hour of 8:16 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
HOMER WILKINSON, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendants: 
ANTHONY MARTINEAU 
RAY G. MARTINEAU 
Attorneys at Law 
3098 Highland Drive, #450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
PAUL M. BELNAP 
Attorney at Law 
Strong & Hanni 
9 Exchange Place, #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A.W. LAURITZEN 
Attorney at Law 
610 North Main 
P.O. Box 171 
Logan, Utah 84321 
COPY 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: The matter before the 
Court is the case of James Gordon Holmes vs. American 
States Insurance and others. 
Would you please state your name and who you 
represent for the record? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Anthony Ray Martineau 
and Ray Martineau for the plaintiff, Mr. Holmes, your 
Honor. 
MR. BELNAP: Paul Belnap for American 
States. 
MR. LAURITZEN: A.W. Lauritzen for 
Economy Auto Wrecking and Clarendon National Insurance 
Company. 
THE COURT: I believe this comes 
before the Court on both the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. 
You may proceed. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I believe 
there is also a motion to try (inaudible) indispensable 
parties to this property before the Court— 
THE COURT: Yes. That's correct. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, we were 
before the Court a few months ago on some motions on this 
2 
matter and—and we set forth the facts at that time, but 
I'd like to briefly review those, if that's all right 
with the Court. 
THE COURT; That's fine. I've read 
your memorandums. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, this case 
involves a 1994 Hummer vehicle that was involved in an 
accident that my client insured for Christiansen 
Development, the owner of that vehicle. 
In the course of dealings between my client and 
its insured, it was determined that my client would pay 
its insured the benefits of the policy. During all of 
that time, the vehicle sat at Carlsen Cadillac, the 
Hummer dealer where it was towed after the accident. 
While it was at Carlsen Cadillac and before my 
client paid its insured the benefits of the policy, the 
plaintiff in this case, Mr. Holmes, went down to Carlsen 
Cadillac and inspected the vehicle there. He inquired 
what was going to happen with the vehicle and Carlsen 
Cadillac, someone there told him that it was a vehicle 
that he could call American States about. And so he did 
so. 
He contacted a representative at my client, 
asked what the intentions were with respect to the 
vehicle and was told, we're not certain and no further 
3 
communication was had between Mr, Holmes and my client 
until after he had purchased the vehicle. 
From that point, Intermountain Towing solicited 
bids for the vehicle from dealers in the State of Utah, 
and Mr. Lauritzen's client, Economy Auto, submitted a bid 
and bought the vehicle, paid a check to my client, 
although he freely states that there was no transaction 
or dealings directly between Economy Auto and American 
States, the check was made to my client and they did 
receive it. 
The vehicle was then towed at the request of 
Mr. Fullmer of Economy Auto to a (sic) auto auction 
facility, Western Affiliated. 
During this time, before the vehicle went on 
the auction block, the plaintiff again inquired about 
purchasing the vehicle and called Mr. Fullmer directly 
and said that he was interested in the vehicle and they 
discussed price and Mr. Holmes made an offer of $15,000 
to buy the vehicle. 
Now, at this point in time, I think it's 
important to the issues of this case that we also 
understand a little bit about Mr. Holmes. He's not an 
unsophisticated purchaser. He has approximately 40 or 50 
vehicles that he's bought and/or restored that he uses in 
a movie set production business that he has among other 
4 
«l ventures, that he rents out these vehicles and allows 
2 i them to be used. 
3 I He's also sophisticated enough that he took 
4 photographs of this vehicle and inspected it before he 
5 bought it and he's the one that did the repairs to it, 
6 Judge. 
j Now, going back to the time that he talks to 
8 Mr. Fullmer, he makes an offer of 15,000, Mr. Fullmer 
9 says that's not enough. The vehicle then goes to auction 
and at the auction, Mr. Holmes is present and inspects 
the vehicle again, at the auction. He doesn't buy it at 
12 J the auction. The vehicle's bought by a company called 
13 j Hillcrest Service at the auction. 
14 I And at the auction, when they buy that vehicle, 
Mr. Holmes then contacts Hillcrest Service and says, I'm 





17 them. And we asked him in his deposition, Was it in the 
same condition as when you inspected it at Carlsen 
Cadillac? The answer is, Yes, it was, except it was 
missing—somebody had stolen its owner's manual out of 
the glovebox; other than that, it was in exactly the same 
condition as when he'd originally inspected it and 
23 I photographed it. 
24 I He received a bill of sale from Hillcrest 







At that point in time, he also received a 
document that was a re-assignment of title that had been 
signed by Economy Auto to Western Affiliated who in turn 
signed it to Hillcrest who in turn signed an assign—a 
re-assignment of title to Mr. Holmes. There's no 
question he knew what he wanted, there's no question he 
knew what he was buying. 
He had even gone to the extent of doing some 
research, which is set out in his deposition to find out 
what the vehicle was worth and he determined that one of 
these vehicles, new, was worth approximately $60,000, 
according to him, and so he made a conscious decision of 
what it was going to cost to repair and what that vehicle 
would be worth to him, knowing that he was buying it as 
is, knowing that he was going to do those repairs, 
knowing exactly what he was buying. 
I asked him in his deposition about this 
research that he did, about the $60,000 and then I asked 
him, your Honor: 
QUESTION: So, you relied on your own 
sense of what this used vehicle, after you fixed 
it, may or may not be worth; is that true? 
ANSWER: I think that's a correct 
statement. 
6 
QUESTION: You knew the vehicle was 
being sold in its damaged condition for what 
value it had in that condition for salvage; is 
that right? 
ANSWER: Yes. As I knew it, when I 
bought it, it was being sold as is, that is 
correct• 
In this case, Judge, the plaintiff claims 
against my client that we are responsible under the 
Consumer Sales Practices Act, under the Motor Vehicle Act 
and under common law, alleged duties of negligence. And 
I'd like to deal with each and also state at the outset, 
that the plaintiff in this case has admitted and it is 
not disputed, that American States is not in the business 
of buying or selling motor vehicles. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Objection, your 
Honor. Mr. Belnap is asserting facts that aren't in 
evidence and he's certainly stating things that are 
contrary to the record. 
American States buys and sells thousands of— 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) argue that, 
Counsel. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Well, but he's not 
talking— 
THE COURT: I will—I will allow you 
7 
1 i t o — 
2 I MR. MARTINEAU: I would lodge an 
3 objection to his argument. 
4 THE COURT: That's fine. 
5 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, we pointed— 
6 THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
7 MR. BELNAP: —we pointed this out in 
8 our moving papers in this case and I would refer the 
g Court to a letter that Mr. Martineau wrote me August 7th, 
1997, before this motion was filed, and it says on Page 4 
of this letter and I quote: 
"It is not disputed that American is not in the 
business of buying or selling motor vehicles." End of 
14 I quote. 
15 MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, that is 
16 i taken out of context. That was in reference to the fact 













sell through their salvage operation's insurance company. 
We don't contest the fact that they're an unlicensed 
motor vehicle dealer. These guys sell thousands and 
thousands of vehicles that they take on salvage 
recoveries and on total loss recoveries. 
THE COURT: You may argue that, 
Counsel. 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, the first 
8 
<l thing that is alleged in this case is that American State 
2 has a fiduciary duty to this plaintiff, Mr. Holmes. As 
3 we briefed, your Honor, it is fundamental law in Utah 
4 that for a fiduciary duty to exist, there must be a 
5 fiduciary relationship between the parties. 
g Not only is there no fiduciary relationship in 
7 this case, there is no relationship at all, as is 
g undisputed in the facts between American States and this 
9 plaintiff. Not only was there not an arm's length 
transaction, there was no transaction directly at all 
between these parties, and we briefed, we feel that claim 








a supplier under the consumer sales practices act, it 
indicates that to be in—to be hooked under that act, or 
to be—have jurisdiction of that act to you, it applies 
17 I to a person who, quote, "regularly solicits, engages or 
enforces consumer transactions11. 
It's undisputed that American States does not 
meet that statutory definition and the plaintiff has 
failed to provide any issue to this Court that would give 
it a basis to say that it's other than summary judgment 
material, as a matter of law on that claim. 
The third basis that the plaintiff claims that 









in the Utah Code, And in that act, there is the creation 
of a civil violation under the following circumstances, 
Judge, and I quote from Section 41-3-702, Sub (3)(c), 
41-3-702, Sub (3)(c). 
Quote: "Fraudulently certifying that a damaged 
motor vehicle is entitled to an unbrand of title as 
defined in 41-la-1001, comma, when it is not. Period." 
Now, in this case, Mr. Holmes, when he went 
through his attempts to purchase this vehicle and 
ultimately bought it from Hillcrest Service, he 
ultimately went to the bank and he ultimately went down 
and applied for a title to this vehicle and received what 
is called in the vernacular an unbranded title. 
He knew what he was buying. He chose the type 
of title that he applied for when this vehicle was 
titled; but going to the heart of this claim that is 
alleged, that American States fraudulently certified that 
a damaged vehicle is entitled to an unbranded title, your 
Honor, it's undisputed in this case that there were no 
representations—underlying the word "no"— 
representations between American States and this 
plaintiff. 
And I suppose one of the most direct things 
that we understand about Utah law, when you read the 
various cases that deal with fraud and the nine elements 
10 
and those other things, is that there has to be some sort 
of a misrepresentation, there has to be a reasonable 
reliance to detriment and there has to be the intent to 
deceive and done with the intent to induce reliance 
thereon. 
Now, the plaintiff argues that there's been a 
reckless misrepresentation. Your Honor, you don't even 
need to get that far, but I want to deal with it anyway, 
because there is an absence. To stand and say there's 
any representation, there is an absence of fact that 
would support that and this claim is clearly ripe to be 
dismissed as a matter of law. 
It does not meet the fraud requirements as set 
forth by our Supreme Court, there have been no 
misrepresentations as between my client and the 
plaintiff. He freely admits he knew what he was buying, 
he dealt with several people in the chain other than us 
and ultimately purchased from the final person that got 
it at the auction. 
Finally, it's claimed very briefly in the 
complaint that—that we're somehow liable under the UCC. 
We believe it is clear under the UCC, your Honor, that 
that involves transactions in goods between a buyer and a 
seller and there is no relationship of buyer and seller 
in this case, as between my client and the plaintiff in 
11 
this case, and we would therefore ask this Court to grant 
our motion for summary judgment, 
I would also state, your Honor, and I don/t 
know to what extent the Court wants to deal with this, 
but after this matter was briefed, the plaintiff 
submitted a supplemental memorandum without leave of this 
Court, we objected to that. If you want to deal with 
that, I/ll certainly take that up on any questions that 
you have, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I've read it and I 
saw your objection and I saw all the things that I think 
this could have a bearing either way as far as the 
decision in this case. 
MR. BELNAP: Thank you. 
MR. LAURITZEN: If it please the 
Court, Mr. Belnap has left me very little to tell the 
Court, it's all been said except for a couple of things 
in the facts. 
The Court needs to understand that somehow 
Intermountain Tow, which is also an automobile dealer, 
got involved in it. They signed a bill of sale or an 
assignment over to Economy Auto. They did so, I take it, 
as an agent for the defendant, American States, because 
that seems to be what it says; but nevertheless, they are 
a dealer. 
12 
1 After they assigned it to Economy, Economy re-
2 assigned the title to Western Affiliated, Thereafter, 
3 Western Affiliated signed it over to Manheim Utah Auto 
4 Auction. Manheim Utah Auto Auction assigned the—re-
5 assigned the whatever it is, re-assigned the documents 
6 over to this group that actually dealt with the 
7 plaintiff, James Gordon Holmes, which was Hilltop— 
8 Hillcrest Auto? Hillcrest Auto, I believe. 
g Other than that, I don't think I can add much 
to the facts and frankly, I'm not going to belabor the 
law because it has been presented very appropriately and 
completely to the Court and it's ready for decision in 
each one of those areas. 
I would only say, if the Court wants me to 
argue the matter of parties, indispensable parties at 
this point, I would go on to that; other than that, I'll 
17 J defer until we're through with the argument on this 
matter. 
THE COURT: Let's wait, resolve some 
of these others before we get into that. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Thank you, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I'd like to direct 

















1 41-la-1005. Subparagraph (l)(a) states: If an insurance 
2 company declares a vehicle a salvaged vehicle and takes 
3 possession of the vehicle for disposal or an insurance 
4 company pays off the owner of a vehicle that is stolen 
5 and not recovered, the insurance company shall within ten 
6 days from the settlement of the loss, surrender to the 
7 division the outstanding certificate of title properly 
8 endorsed or other evidence of ownership acceptable to the 
division. 
I would also like to direct the Court's 




12 (2) which states, any person, insurance company or dealer 
licensed under 41, Chapter 3, Part 2, licensing, who 
fails to obtain a salvage certificate as required in this 
section or who sells a vehicle without first obtaining a 
salvage certificate is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. 
Your Honor, our client investigated this 
vehicle. He made inquiry concerning the status of the 
vehicle and he understood he was buying a used motor 
vehicle. It's not uncommon for dealers to sell vehicles 










„ I damage to them, you see thousands and thousands of used 
vehicles sold with a bent fender or a ding in them, but 
in this instance, your Honor, the defendants7 own 





cost/ new, something less than that. 
The defendants have produced copies of their 
invoices that they paid the loss on this vehicle• The 
defendant turned around and they sold the vehicle for 
$12,000. That's about one-fourth of its fair market 
value. 
In the documents that American States Insurance 
Company has produced and that have been submitted to the 
Court as exhibits, we have a document that was received 
on August 28th, 1995, identifying this vehicle as a roll-
over , total loss. 
I have another document dated August 11th, 
1995, where again the defendant, American States, states 
that this vehicle is a total loss. 
I have the defendants' repair estimates 
reflecting the fact that it's going to cost in excess of 
$33,855 to repair this vehicle. 
Your Honor, the law is very clear, this is a 
problem that the Court has seen us in front of you before 
on in other matters and this is such a problem that the 
Utah Legislature has taken affirmative action and imposed 
legal duties upon insurance companies and upon dealers 
that deal in motor vehicles so that the Court doesn't 
have to hear these kind of motions, so that the Court 
doesn't have to go back in and re-decide every cotton 
15 
picking case that comes up as to whether a vehicle has 
been damaged and is salvage or isn't. 
We have also, your Honor, obtained the warranty 
service records for the vehicle in question. The 
warranty service vehicle records from Carlsen Cadillac— 
MR. BELNAP: Excuse me. I'd object 
to this, your Honor. If you want to consider it, we'll 
abide by the Court's ruling, but we were before the Court 
prior on this motion for summary judgment, counsel for 
plaintiff filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking for additional 
time to do discovery, when the case had been pending for 
over a year. 
MR. MARTINEAU: That's not true, your 
Honor. 
MR. BELNAP: This Court— 
MR. MARTINEAU: The case had been 
pending for nine months— 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. MARTINEAU: —Mr. Belnap was not 
coun— 
THE COURT: Counsel, let him finish. 
MR. MARTINEAU: But I'm not going to 
be— 
THE COURT: Counsel, let him finish. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Then have him state 
16 
10 
<l the facts— 
2 THE COURT: Counsel. 
3 You may finish, Mr. Belnap. 
4 MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, we were 
5 before the Court on a 56(f) motion when this case had 
g been filed and pending up to that time. This Court heard 
7 the motion and said it was not well taken and told 
g counsel for the plaintiff to respond to the motions, 
g At that point, your Honor, under my 
understanding of procedure, Utah procedure, discovery is 
^ I closed while this motion is pending and Counsel proceeded 
2^ with additional depositions by way of subpoena to Carlsen 
-I2 Cadillac for records. 
14 We haven't taken the deposition of those 
15 people, they're simply documents that have been supplied. 
16 I I don't know what the value is of them or not or what the 
17 I underlying substance of them is, but I think it's a clear 
violation of what this Court ordered. 
And for them to proceed and now try to 
introduce these hearsay documents, if you want to submit 
them to yourself for review and consideration in this 
case, so be it; but I think it's a violation of the 
procedure and the order that was in front of this Court 








25 Thank you. 
17 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, this case 
was filed in Janu—or February of 1997. The motion for 
summary judgment was filed in October of 1997, it wasn't 
a year old, as Mr. Belnap indicated. And Mr. Belnap 
knows full well that notwithstanding motions for summary 
judgment, discovery is still allowed. And he, in the 
Campbell vs. State Farm case, engaged in extensive 
discovery after motions for summary judgment were not 
only filed, but granted, and the case was on appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
There is nothing in the rules that preclude or 
prohibit us from putting the facts together necessary to 
try our case. 
THE COURT: And I—I, in this matter, 
ruled, I did rule as far as 56(f) motions and continuing 
the depositions through that, but I did not give an order 
stopping all further discovery in the matter. I would 
allow any material as admissible material to argued on 
summary judgment. 
MR. MARTINEAU: The purpose for 
bringing this to the Court's attention, your Honor, is 
that Carlsen Cadillac, who was in possession of the 
vehicle from the time it was rolled until it was disposed 




1 history records that this vehicle has a void warranty, 
2 vehicle scrapped. 
3 This is reflected on numerous invoices that 
4 have been submitted to both counsel and we also have an 
5 invoice when the vehicle was damaged and rolled, brought 
6 in, it shows that there's extensive body damage, vehicle 
Y rolled three times. 
8 This was never disclosed to the plaintiff. 
9 This was never made known to the plaintiff. As far as 
the plaintiff, knew, he was buying a used motor vehicle 
with some prop—body damage and it wasn't until after he 













repairs that he was informed by Carlsen Cadillac that 
this was a salvaged motor vehicle, that the warranty 
service records reflected that it was scrap, that it 
didn't exist and it was no longer on the available—or no 
17 longer manufacturer's warranty available on it. 
THE COURT: Tell me, Counsel, when 
the car is sold as is, regardless of whether it's 
scrapped or not, does the warranty apply or is the 
warranty voided at that point anyway? 
MR. MARTINEAU: This vehicle had 
9,000 on it. Mr.—the—the warranty would be—there 
would be no warranty as between our purchaser, the 
plaintiff, and Hillcrest Auto, or those that—that— 
19 
4 
•j because they made no— 
2 THE COURT: But you're saying there's 
3 J a factory warranty? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Pardon me? 
5 I THE COURT: But you're saying there's 
6 a factory warranty? 
7 MR. MARTINEAU: There is a factory— 
8 there should have been a factory warranty in addition—or 
g and—and—and a dealer may or may not extend other 
additional warranties, depending upon the particular 
dealer; but this had less than 10,000 miles on it and 
12 I these vehicles come with a 40,000-mile warranty on them. 
-13 Your Honor, the point of this case is that this 
vehicle was declared as salvage,- the facts demonstrate 
that it was a salvage. The facts also demonstrate that 















who salvage out or pay losses on vehicles. 
The facts are also very clear that Economy Auto 
knew full well that it was buying a salvaged motor 
vehicle and nevertheless failed to take the affirmative 
steps imposed upon it to obtain the salvage title, as 
required by law. 
We have litigated cases very similar to this 
and in one instance, in front of Judge Dee Benson in 
20 
-I Federal Court on a case virtually identical to this, 
2 Judge Benson recognized that this is a very similar to 
3 the thief who has been caught, out in the parking lot 
4 with a bunch of goods and he in turn offers to give the 
5 goods back and therefore, not to prosecute him or not to-
6 -to go after him for the other damages that he's caused. 
7 Judge Benson recognized that when a dealer 
g doesn't comply with the Motor Vehicle Act and doesn't 
g disclose the salvage, that's just like the—the thief out 
in the parking lot that's been caught. 
American's and Economy's belated offers at this 
point to correct the problem and get him a salvage title, 
doesn't remedy the problem that has been engendered here 
14 I by their having committed civil and criminal violations 
of the Motor Vehicle Act. 
















bottom line is, for purposes of this case, if you go to 
the statute and there's—it's interesting to note that 
there was no argument rebutting what I said in my opening 
argument about this, that the statute is very clear when 
it talks about civil penalties, that the only penalty 
that applies is, quote, "Fraudulently certifying that the 
vehicle is entitled to an unbranded title." 
And there has been no fraudulent certification 
21 
in this case, there's no representations, there's no 
dealings between myself or between American States and 
Mr. Holmes, and therefore, as a matter of law, the civil 
penalties in this do not apply and to say otherwise, 
there's no support for it. 
And the other arguments haven't been rebutted, 
I ~ 
THE COURT: Is the plaintiff entitled 
to a warranty on that vehicle? 
MR. BELNAP: Your Honor, that's not 
an issue that was briefed before the Court and those 
documents were subpoenaed from Carlsen Cadillac after 
the—the briefing was done in this case, and I don't know 
the answer to that, Judge. I don't know why Carlsen has 
listed that on their records, perhaps mistakenly. 
I felt that while the summary judgments were 
pending and a 56(f) had been denied, that discovery was— 
was closed and so we didn't proceed with any depositions 
of the Carlsen people, nor have the plaintiff. They 
simply obtained those documents, for which we don't have 
an explanation as to who or why they were created or—or 
what they mean, Judge. 
The vehicle was at Carlsen when the plaintiff 
himself went down there, checked on it, spoke with 
Carlsen. 
22 
1 THE COURT: Is Carlsen the seller, 
2 original seller of the vehicle? 
3 MR. BELNAP: Carlsen is a dealer. 
4 The original seller— 
5 THE COURT: Well, they're—they're a 
6 dealer, so what, they could go to that dealer to get 
j warranty work? 
MR. BELNAP: Yes. 
g I THE COURT: That's correct? 
10 MR. BELNAP: They're—they're—as I 
^ I understand it, right next to Carlsen Cadillac is a—is a 














relationship between Carlsen and the Hummer; but I—you 
know, I guess you could assume that there's some control 
there since Carlsen generated some documents, but I don't 
know the answer to that, Judge. And I don't think that's 
17 germane to the summary judgment that's before the Court, 
I think what's germane is clearly, when you 
look at the statute that applies for the civil penalty, 
did American States fraudulently certify that the vehicle 
was entitled to an unbranded title and the answer is no. 
And we're not—the other provisions that have 
been alleged or the other basis that's been alleged in 
the complaint don't apply either, and that hasn't been 
rebutted in argument. 
23 
6 
•j Thank you, Judge. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. LAURITZEN: The documents 
4 provided by the plaintiff indicate that Carlsen sold the 
5 vehicle to Richie Smith, it looks to me like. 
THE COURT: Who's Smith? Did Smith 
•j I sell it to Christensen or do you know? 
g MR. LAURITZEN: I don't have any 
9 idea, I just have a document here which is dated '94, 
from Carlsen Cadillac which shows the purchase price of 
$60,067. Shows Richie Smith as the purchaser, Carlsen as 
the seller. (Inaudible) 
All I know is the vehicle was sold by Carlsen, 
14 I the Court inquired about the answer to that. 
15 THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. LAURITZEN: No. 
THE COURT: I want to ask Mr. 
Martineau a question, and it's raised, but it came to my 
mind and also Mr. Lauritzen raised it in his argument, 
his written argument, what are your damages in this case? 
What do you claim to be able to prove as far as damages? 
MR. MARTINEAU: The difference 
between an unsalvaged motor vehicle and a—and a Hummer 
motor vehicle that has a salvaged brand new title. Our 
















«l specialty vehicle, the damages are going to be somewhere 
2 in the vicinity of 20 percent. That a salvage motor 
3 vehicle in this—in this—of this type would be worth 
4 approximately 20 percent or less than what the non-
5 salvaged vehicle would be worth. 
6 THE COURT: So your—that is, you're 
7 not—you're not alleging damages for the failure of the 
Q dealer to get the warranty of the vehicle? 
g MR. MARTINEAU: We have sued Economy 
10 | Auto and we believe that that's an issue of special 
^ I damages that a jury should consider and decide. 
12 THE COURT: Then answer my question 
directly. Answer my question directly. Are you alleging 
damages of the failure to have the warranty from the 
dealer to your client? 














initiated. Our client went in for warranty repairs and 
was told there's no warranty here. 
THE COURT: So, in other words, if 
you had the—had the warranty, then you wouldn't bring 
the lawsuit? 
MR. MARTINEAU: No. There's a second 
basis for this, your Honor, and that is, this vehicle is 
a salvaged motor vehicle and the defendants, American 
25 
States and Economy Auto, did not procure the mandatory 
salvage certificate of title within ten days, as they 
were required to do. And a salvaged vehicle is worth 
significantly less than a non-salvaged vehicle. 
So, we have—we have both of those claims 
herein and both of those will have damages particular 
thereto. 
THE COURT: One other question. 
Paul, in your brief, you refer to Section 70—or Section 
41-3-702, Subsection 4, where you cite civil penalty for 
violation under Subsection 1 is (a) not less than 1,000 
or treble the actual damages caused by the person, 
whichever is greater; and (b) reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs of the action. 
Now, this just doesn't make sense to me. It 
says violation of Subsection 1. Subsection 1 of that 
para—of that, is—is a bunch going to the civil 
violation of Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3. 
MR. MARTINEAU: That's correct, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: This doesn't have 
anything to do with your case, does it? 
MR. MARTINEAU: It certainly does. 
THE COURT: How does it? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Economy Auto is a 
26 
5 
1 licensed and bonded motor vehicle dealer and it's subject 
2 to all the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act. As you 
3 look at Subsection 1, Level A, Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, 
4 those refer back to provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act 
found i n — 
g I THE COURT: What do you mean, where 
j do they refer back? 
8 MR. MARTINEAU: T h e y — p a r d o n me? 
9 THE COURT: Where do they refer back? 
1 0 MR. MARTINEAU: Okay. For e x a m p l e — 
n THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
12 MR- MARTINEAU: Then for example, if 
I were to show—go on to Subsection (l)(a). Failure to 
1 4 I display business license. 
If you go back into the Motor Vehicle Act under 
41-1A, et c e t e r a — 
THE COURT: W e l l — 
MR. MARTINEAU: — t h e r e are 
provisions t h a t — t h a t impose upon a dealer an obligation 
to display his business license. 
THE COURT: Where does it say 
unbranded or branded title in Subsection (1)? 
MR. MARTINEAU: We have a violation 











2 5 I Economy Auto. 
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THE COURT: I don't buy that. That 
doesn't satisfy me, as far as branded and unbranded 
title. 
In other words, what I'm saying is, is, I 
understand what you're citing here and I don't see where 
that follows as a penalty for failure to get a—a branded 
title. And I—you—maybe (inaudible) today and just read 
it last—yesterday and went over it a couple of time, and 
I couldn't follow it, so that's why I'm asking you and I 
don't see where your penalty here, you have a criminal 
penalty, but that's—that's not available to your client. 
And the civil penalty, this one here, I don't see is 
available to your client. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Well— 
THE COURT: And I could be wrong, I'm 
just asking. And of course, that— 
MR. MARTINE1AU: Would it be 
appropriate, your Honor, if we briefed this and submitted 
it to you in the form of a letter so that we have time to 
adequately to go through the statute and address your 
concerns? 
THE COURT: Well, it may be, and of 
course, that may be somewhat what Mr. Phelps—Mr. Phelps-
-Mr. Belnap. I keep wanting to call you— 
MR. BELNAP: He and I— 
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THE COURT: You both look alike, you 
both— 
MR. BELNAP: He and I tease each 
other that we're brothers with different names, Judge. 
THE COURT: Right. 
Mr. Belnap also indicated questions on this 
warranty situation. 
Okay, Counsel. 
MR. MARTINEAU: The significant thing 
here, your Honor, is that there are criminal penalties 
that are imposed upon people who do not comply with the 
Motor Vehicle Act. 
This is as comparable to somebody running a 
stop sign or a stop light,— 
THE COURT: Yeah, well, I don't— 
MR. MARTINEAU: —causing injury or 
damages, and whether we get treble damages or actual 
damages, we are entitled to damages for having violated 
the Motor Vehicle Act. 
We are also entitled to damages under Mr. 
Fullmer, Economy Auto's bond for motor vehicle dealer, 
salesman and crusher, because that bond specifically 
provides for a payment of attorneys' fees in those 
instances where the dealer fails to comply with the law, 
the rules or regulations concerning commerce in motor 
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vehicles. 
And so, not directly on point, but I—I do know 
of those independent bases upon which our client is 
entitled to recover damages herein and his costs and 
attorneys' fees, plus the Consumer Sales Practices Act 
provides for costs and attorneys' fees and double damages 
if this—if it's determined that Economy and American 
acted unconscionably and under the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, one of the—when you deal with 
consequential damages arising out of a breach, attorneys' 
fees are awarded under the Commercial Code as well. 
We have— 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Are there— 
THE COURT: You may—are you through? 
MR. MARTINEAU: Are there any 
questions I can address to the Court? 
THE COURT: No, that's—that's all, 
and I will allow you to have the last say on it. 
MR. BELNAP: Judge, with respect to 
further briefing, we'll abide by the Court's directions, 
but I would simply point out, your Honor, that there was 
extensive briefing at the time we came before you at the 
56(f) and motion to compel hearing. There's been 










<l supplemental memorandum and we think it's appropriate to 
2 submit this case and there hasn't been a showing that 
3 it's not ripe for summary judgment, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to rule 
5 this way, Counsel, and in light, of course, of what Mr. 
g Martineau said, maybe the Court was hasty in the Rule 56 
7 motion; however, I don't think I was, going to what was 
g being asked at that time. 
But I am concerned as far as this issue of 
warranty. I'm of this opinion and I'm so ruling, that I 
don't believe plaintiff has a cause of action under the— 
under the Consumer Practices Act or the Uniform 
Commercial Code. I think this comes under the motor 
vehicle section, dealer violation. 
I think that I'll—I'll—I'll allow Counsel to 
bring further information to me, whether this provision 









or unbranded title, the Court, at this point, can't 
follow a fact to that. I'll—this gentleman is not 
entitled to any criminal penalties, so don't waste time 
arguing criminal penalties to me. 
My question here, and I'm also ruling that— 
well, I should probably make more findings of fact, too. 
That the automobile was, I believe that you argued in 









-j supplemental memorandum and we think it's appropriate to 
2 submit this case and there hasn't been a showing that 
3 it's not ripe for summary judgment, your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to rule 
5 this way, Counsel, and in light, of course, of what Mr. 
6 Martineau said, maybe the Court was hasty in the Rule 56 
7 motion; however, I don't think I was, going to what was 
8 being asked at that time. 
9 But I am concerned as far as this issue of 
warranty. I'm of this opinion and I'm so ruling, that I 
don't believe plaintiff has a cause of action under the— 
under the Consumer Practices Act or the Uniform 
Commercial Code. I think this comes under the motor 
vehicle section, dealer violation. 
I think that I'll—I'll—I'll allow Counsel to 
bring further information to me, whether this provision 









or unbranded title, the Court, at this point, can't 
follow a fact to that. I'll—this gentleman is not 
entitled to any criminal penalties, so don't waste time 
arguing criminal penalties to me. 
My question here, and I'm also ruling that— 
well, I should probably make more findings of fact, too. 
That the automobile was, I believe that you argued in 
your brief, it sold for 48,000-something, Mr. Martineau? 
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MR. MARTINEAU: That's what the 
insurance company paid for the loss, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Did you want to argue 
that it was more than what it was bought—paid—bought 
for? 
MR. MARTINEAU: That's correct, your 
Honor, I've got an exhibit attached, if I could approach 
the bench and show you what— 
THE COURT: No, I'm just—I'm just 
making these findings. 
That the vehicle, as argued by Mr. Martineau, 
sold for 48,600-something, that the insurance company 
paid 48—9—forty-nine eight for it, get those exact 
figures; that, and again, you'll have to help me, that 
the plaintiff offered to pay American—was it 10,000? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Twelve— 
THE COURT: Twelve thousand? 
MR. LAURITZEN: Well, the plaintiff 
was ten— 
THE COURT: Was twelve and that he 
finally—he offered Economy before the auction— 
MR. LAURITZEN: Fifteen. 
THE COURT: —fifteen, and then he 
eventually bought it for— 
MR. MARTINEAU: Twenty-five thousand-
32 
-twenty-three five, 
THE COURT: That the plaintiff saw 
the vehicle while in the possession of Carlsen and/or 
American, he saw the vehicle in the possession of 
Economy, he saw the vehicle at the auto auction, he— 
then, of course, I guess, purchased from Hillcrest and 
saw it again• 
That the Court would find that the plaintiff 
had knowledge and knew the condition of the vehicle, that 
he was a sophisticated buyer, he had dealt in these 
matters before and had every opportunity to know 
concerning the—the condition of the vehicle. 
That the plaintiff was not at any time misled 
or misrepresented to, there was no fraud, he never relied 
on anything as far as statements, or on the branded or 
unbranded title; that there was not a fiduciary 
relationship in any way between the plaintiff and the 
defendants. 
At first blush, this may be the case, it 
appears that the plaintiff may have buyer's remorse in 
this matter, that he was not a bona fide purchaser, all— 
entitled to the protection of the provisions requiring 
the insurance companies and/or automobile dealers to 
obtain a branded title. 
And the Court would grant the defendants' 
33 
6 
-I motions as far as any cause of action under the Consumer 
2 Sales Practices Act or the—or the UCC or the—or any 
3 type of fraudulent act. 
4 MR. LAURITZEN: So that would be 70— 
5 41-3-702 (3), Sub C, your Honor, fraudulent certifying? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
7 I MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. 
8 THE COURT: That the Court is 
9 concerned and the Court does not rule on this, that the 
plaintiff, in obtaining an unbranded title, the question 
whether he's entitled to the warranty done on that vehi— 
on—on—warranty placed on that vehicle, is entitled to 
benefits off that warranty, and the Court will not rule 
on that matter at this time, leave that matter open as 
far as cause of action is concerned. 

















warranty still extends or not. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Your Honor, in terms 
of the warranty, obviously my client has no control over 
a dealer or manufacturer and I'm wondering, just laying 
this out, should they sue them if we're— 
THE COURT: Well, not—I was going to 
go on and say— 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. Excuse me. 
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THE COURT: —something else, but I 
think this leads to the issue raised by Mr. Lauritzen, as 
far as joining of other parties in this lawsuit. I don't 
believe he mentions Carlsen Cadillac, maybe Carlsen 
Cadillac needs to be brought in as far as the warranty 
situation is concerned. 
Now, I'm not prepared at this time to dismiss 
out completely American States, Economy and Clarendon 
National Insurance Company because of the fact that 
whether their failure still under the Act to obtain that 
branded title led the plaintiff to getting an unbranded 
title, misled him to believe that he still had the right 
to receive warranty work. Even though he saw the vehicle 
and knew the condition, there may be a question whether 
he believed it was scrapped or not scrapped. 
And therefore, what I'm saying, I guess, is it 
boils down to, the only thing that I leave in this case 
is the question of whether the plaintiff's entitled to 
warranty work on that automobile. 
Any questions? 
Now, except as to your motion and I'm not 
ruling on your motion. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Right. And that's 
what I was going to address very briefly. Of course, I 
suppose all of the parties that were in the chain that— 
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that were qualified, might have neglected to do that and 
it might ultimately become a cause of action which they 
could recover on as the Court's just said. 
Also, perhaps in that case, we should join—we 
should think about joining Carlsen and I would amend our 
motion to that point and press it upon the Court, based 
on my brief and on what the Court has said. 
MR. BELNAP: But your Honor, we 
don't—I guess subject to this additional research that 
you've asked Mr. Martineau to look at on Subsection 1, we 
may not even need to get to that point. 
Am I missing something there? 
THE COURT: Well, no. I think you're 
right. You may not get to it, but you may also, I don't 
know. 
MR. BELNAP: Okay. 
THE COURT: I—I don't know what the 
liability's going to be for these parties. 
MR. BELNAP: If—if in other words, 
if somehow Mr. Martineau can convince the Court that a 
dealer's warranty or the failure to get a dealer's 
warranty somehow fits under Subsection l of 41-3-702, 
then we may be revisiting this at another hearing? 
THE COURT: That's right. And I 
would be inclined, subject to—I don't know what Mr. 
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1 Martineau's going to be—say, but would be inclined to 
2 grant the motion to join the additional parties and also 
3 Carlsen Cadillac. I don't know where you are, Mr. 
4 Martineau. 
MR. MARTINEAU: I understood the 
6 I Court's ruling to be a little broader than what Mr. 
•j Belnap reflected, I understood that we were able to 
g pursue the claims for American's failure to obtain a 
branded title. 
THE COURT: If—if that led to the~ 
to the—the failure to his receiving a warranty on that 
vehicle. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Okay. The issue of 
joining Carlsen, is—is really kind of a red herring. We 
15 I are unhappy with, and our client is unhappy with the fact 
1g | that there was no manufacturer's warranty on this, 
17 I Carlsen didn't extend any warranty. 
THE COURT: Oh. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Which is the American 
General dealership itself, it was the American General 
dealer—the American General warranty that—that was 
void. 
THE COURT: Well, whoever— 
MR. MARTINEAU: And—and that was 

















THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MARTINEAU: —salvage and it was 
never disclosed. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MARTINEAU: And so— 
THE COURT: Maybe there needs to be 
some third party, some cross-claims or so forth on it, I 
don't know. And Carlsen may not be a proper party then, 
maybe it is this—who did you say, American or— 
MR. MARTINEAU: American General is 
the manufacturer and it's the manufacturer's warranty 
that was not on it. 
MR. BELNAP: So in other words, the 
Hummer is manufactured— 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I— 
THE COURT: Yeah, let him—let him 
finish, Mr. Belnap. 
MR. BELNAP: But I just need to 
clarify, the Hummer's manufactured by— 
MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, I was 
not— 
MR. BELNAP: —American General— 
MR. MARTINEAU: — I was not— 
MR. BELNAP: —is that right? 
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1 MR. MARTINEAU: I didn't interfere 
2 like that with Mr. Belnap. 
3 THE COURT: Yeah, Counsel, let him 
4 i finish. 







THE COURT: Counsel. No. 
MR. BELNAP: Yeah. 
Q I MR. MARTINEAU: Your Honor, American 
g General had no dealing with American States to term it as 
a salvage in salvaging this motor vehicle. American— 
American General had no bearing on American—American 
States' failure to comply with the statute to get t h e — 
the—the branded title. American General had no bearing, 
1 4 I had n o — n o way to know that Economy Auto wasn't going to 
fulfill the statutory duty and wasn't going to get a 
branded title. 
And there was no one in the chain of title 
after Economy Auto that had any duty or obligation 
because the statute only posed the duty and obligation on 
American States and upon Economy Auto. It doesn't impose 
it upon anybody else. 
THE COURT: Okay. But d o e s — 
MR. MARTINEAU: These are not the 
parties necessary to conflict—to unnecessarily compound 













1 just not necessary, 
2 THE COURT: Well, Mr- Laur—now, it 
3 appears to me what you're saying, as I look at this case 
4 and I don't tell you how to run your case, you know more 
5 about it than I do, if this gentleman has a cause of 
g action against the manufacturer, American so-and-so, and 
7 maybe they—maybe they have a cause of action then 
g against American and Economy and—and the other two for 
failure to declare that title a branded title. 
MR. BELNAP: That's what my question 
was, Judge, 'cause I—I haven't researched who all the 
manufacturers was. I was just asking, American General's 
the manufacturer and if they're the people that somehow 
made a decision which we don't know if there is or isn't 
a warranty, if that's the claim that the Court—which the 
Court is focusing on now, then they—they've got to be 
17 I the people in the case or we've got to have some research 
and a threshold question that would even get to that 
point under 41-3-702(1) and that's what I understand the 
Court's ruling to be. 













22 I MR. BELNAP: Okay 
23 , MR. MARTINEAU: May I be heard on 
2 4 I that, your Honor? 
25 i THE COURT: Sure. 
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MR. MARTINEAU: The manufacturer had 
the usual manufacturer's warranty that goes with vehicles 
that they sell. Whether or not that warranty is valid, 
depends on what American States and/or Economy Auto did, 
there's no reason for American General to be brought in. 
Either the warranty's good or it isn't, depending on what 
they did. 
THE COURT: Well, and you may be 
right, that's what I said. 
MR. MARTINEAU: That's why we don't 
need them in— 
THE COURT: Well— 
MR. MARTINEAU: —because we need 
first to see what their breach was, what the American and 
Economy's duty was, whether they breached it and whether 
that breach has an effect on whether the warranty's in 
effect or not. 
THE COURT: Well, and I'm not going 
to tell you, either one of you, what to do in this case. 
I'm stating that you have the right to bring in 
American— 
MR. MARTINEAU: General. 
THE COURT: —General, or Carlsen 
Cadillac or anybody, because I've granted your motion to 






1 I said that it appears to me that the gentleman—the 
2 plaintiff's damages, if any, are under the warranty, for 
3 failure to have a warranty. If the manufacturer isn't 
4 going to honor that warranty, then he has a cause of 
5 action against them and they h a v e — m a y b e have a cause of 
g action against the people who did not get t h e — t h e 
branded title. 
g I Whether you think you can go, skip over them 
9 and go right to them, that's up to you; of course, they 
may want to bring them in, I don't know. 
MR. MARTINEAU: Yeah. We have no 
problem, present day, we think we have the right parties 
here, throughout— 
7 











to them the right to bring in the parties that they wish 
to and I'll—and you, too, for that matter. 
17 MR. LAURITZEN: But we still, your 
Honor, to clarify, we still have to take a two-step 
approach. There has to be a showing, as you've ruled, 
under 41-3-702 (1) that this warranty issue was intended 
to be covered under this Level 1, 2, 3 issue, that—so 
that we get to that as a matter of law before we go out 
and start suing other companies that made a decision on 
whether there is or isn't a warranty. 
THE COURT: I don't know. I don't—I 
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don't think it—off the top of my head, I don't agree 
with that. I think they have a cause of action with the 
warranty regardless of the statute, but I don't know 
that. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. Then the 
question—I'm—I'm asking for clarification whether 
there's going to be any additional briefing then before 
we start to go out and—and go after people that have 
made decisions on this warranty, because that's what I 
thought— 
THE COURT: I don't think we need any 
additional briefing. The only thing I'm saying is 
warranty, which I question, and which he wants to brief, 
which he had—where his damages were and what his cause 
of action was. If he claims he has a cause of action 
under the warranty for damages, he can proceed, he 
doesn't need to brief it. 
MR. LAURITZEN: I understand the 
Court's ruling then that it's related to whether there is 
a cause of action for the warranty. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. LAURITZEN: Okay. Who gets to 
prepare the order, your Honor? 
MR. BELNAP: I'll—well, excuse me, 
I'll prepare it, if you'd like. 
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1 THE COURT: That's fine with me. You 
2 feel comfortable with that? Okay. You prepare the 
3 order, Mr. Belnap. 
4 MR. MARTINEAU: Where do we go to get 
5 a copy of the transcript of this hearing (inaudible) your 
6 i Honor. 
7 I THE COURT: Here, I guess it's all on 
o tape. 
g I MR. BELNAP: We will need the Court's 
10 I ruling. 
.... I (Inaudible) 
12 THE COURT: Yeah, talk to~he knows 
13 i more about it than I do. 
14 I (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
15 
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KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRT HTS. NO.: 95054257. i 
That Market Insurance Company
 v corporation"), a corporation organized and existing 
under the lews o* the State of Illinois, with its main office at Shand Morahan Plaza in the 
City of Evanston, Illinois, does hereby nominate, constitute and appoint, for the purpose 
stated herein, Financial Pacific Insurance Agency, Sacramento, California* acting through 
its staff, Robert C. QoodeU and Robert T. Wngsiey, its true and lawfU attorney-in-fact, with 
full power and authority to make, execute and deliver, for and on its behalf as surety, and 
as its act and deed, in Illinois and States where the Corporation is qualified to act as an 
admitted insurer, aU bonds, recognizances, undertakings, contracts of suretyship or other 
written obligations required pursuant to the license and permit bond program administered 
for it by Fnanctel Pacific Insurance Agency with a limit of liability not to exceed $50,000 
per writing; and the execution of such bonds in pursuance of these presents shall be as 
binding upon said Markel Insurance Company to all intents and purposes as if duly 
executed by its Chairman, Vice Chairman, President, Senior Vice President and Chief 
Administrative Officer, sealed with its corporate seal, and attested by its Secretary or 
Assistant Secretary. 
This Power of Attorney shall only be valid as evidenced In original form; no copy, certified 
or otherwise, shall have any validity or effect- This Power of Attorney is made and 
executed by authority of a resolution adopted by the Board of Directors, of which the 
following is a true and exact copy. 
-RESOLVED: 
That, pursuant to Section 8.8 of the Corporation's Bylaws, the Chairman, 
Vtoe Chairman, President, Senior Vice President, or Chief Administrative 
Officer, with the Secretary or Assistant Secretary, is hereby authorized to 
appoint Financial Pacific Insurance Agency, Sacramento, California, 
acting through its surety staff, Robert C. Goodell and Robert T. Wngsiey, 
as the Corporation's attorney-in-fact with authority to make and execute 
j on behalf of the Corporation, in Illinois and States where the Corporation 
Is qualified to act as an admitted insurer, bonds, recognizances, 
undertakings, contracts of suretyship or other written obligations required 
pursuant to the license and permit bonds program administered for it by 
Financial Pacific Insurance Agency with a limit of liability not to exceed 
$50,000 per writing; also to execute such instruments as may be 
necessary or proper in connection with the settlement of claims or the 
recovery of reinsurance or salvage. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Markel Insurance Company has caused these presents to be 
signed by rts duly authorized ofTicers and its Corporate Seal to be hereunto affixed this 
26th day Of April , 19_96 




IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FILED 
S E P . 9-J999 
JAMES GORDON HOLMES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Corporation, ECONOMY 
AUTO INC., a Corporation, and 
CLARENDON NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Corporation, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 990168 
ARGUMENT 
PRIORITY 15 
COPIES OF ORDERS APPEALED FROM 
1. ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(F) MOTION AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL, DATED March 16,1998 
2. ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED JUNE 
10, 1998, and 
3. ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DATED JANUARY 22, 
1998. 
DATED this 9 day of September, 1999. 
/%*£ r/*t. >-^y s& *^7st^ &T.-C- £*. 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Copies Of Orders Appealed 
From was served upon the following individuals, by mailing a copy thereof, 
postage prepaid, at the addresses shown below this / day of September, 1999. 
Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
A. W. Lauritizen 
610 North Main 
Logan, UT 84321 
~Z 
Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
American States Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES GORDON HOLMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation; 
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a 
corporation; and CLARENDON 
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S 
RULE 56(f) MOTION AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 970900877CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 20th day of February, 1998, 
before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, with plaintiff represented by his 
counsel of record and the defendants represented by their counsel of record. The matter was 
scheduled for all pending motions including the following: 
1. Defendant American States' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion for Continuance of Summary Judgment of American 
States. 
3. Plaintiffs Second Motion to Compel Discovery. 
The court reviewed the pleadings submitted in support of and in opposition to the 
pending matters and deferred hearing and ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendant American States granting the plaintiff additional time to respond to said motion and 
that of the defendant Economy Auto, as set forth in this order. Based upon the pleadings 
submitted to the court and argument of counsel and the court having ruled on these matters in 
open court, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs Rule 56(f) 
Motion is not well taken and the same is denied. However, the court grants to the plaintiff up to 
and including March 9, 1998 to respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant 
American States and to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Economy Auto. 
The plaintiffs Motion to Compel argued and briefed before the court is not well 
taken and the same is denied. 
DATED this day of February, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this day of February, 1998, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Regarding Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ray G Martineau 
Anthony R Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
A W Lauritzen 
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto 
610 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
1164 998 
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Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG &HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
American States Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUN 10 E98 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES GORDON HOLMES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation; 
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a 
corporation; and CLARENDON 
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970900877CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 14* day of May, 1998, at the 
hour of 8:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge, with the 
parties appearing by and through their counsel of record. The matters considered by the court 
were the motion for summary judgement of the defendant American States Insurance, and the 
motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative motion to join indispensable parties of 
Economy Auto, Inc. 
The court, having reviewed the motions and memoranda in support of and in 
opposition to the same, and having heard the arguments of counsel and for good cause appearing, 
determined that all of the plaintiffs claims against the defendants should be dismissed and 
summary judgment granted, dismissing all claims of the plaintiff against the defendants other than 
such claims, if any, that might arise if plaintiff can establish a triable issue that the nature and type 
of title received by plaintiff (to the vehicle in question) led to an alleged failure of the plaintiff to 
receive a factory warranty on the subject vehicle. 
The basis for the court's decision and conclusions is as follows: 
1. The plaintiff does not have a cause of action under the Uniform Commercial Code 
since the defendants were not sellers to the plaintiff. 
2. The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et seq., "Utah Consumer Sales 
Practices Act" does not apply to the defendant American States as it is not a "supplier" as 
contemplated under the act (U.C.A §13-11-3(6)). 
3. The vehicle in question originally was purchased by the insured of defendant 
American States for $45,297. 
4. After the vehicle was involved in an accident, American States paid its insured, 
pursuant to the policy of insurance, the sum of $48,670. 
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5. After the vehicle was involved in an accident, it was towed to the "Hummer" 
dealership at Carlson Cadillac and was seen by the plaintiff at said dealership where plaintiff 
inquired as to the purchase of the same. 
6. The vehicle was purchased, through a bid process through Intermountain Tow, by 
the defendant Economy Auto for $12,000 and a check was written in said amount from defendant 
Economy Auto to American States. 
7. The plaintiff offered to purchase the vehicle from Economy Auto for $15,000 but 
Economy Auto determined to consign the vehicle to an auction (Utah Auto Auction) through the 
auspices of Western Affiliated Auction, a licensed Utah automotive dealer. 
8. The vehicle was sold at auction and the plaintiff attended the auction. 
9. At the auction, the vehicle was purchased by a company known as Hillcrest 
Service for $18,000. The plaintiff in turn purchased the subject vehicle from Hillcrest Service for 
$23,500 and received an executed bill of sale, indicating in part "Used vehicles are sold as 
accepted and are not guaranteed." 
10. Plaintiff saw, photographed and inspected the vehicle while it was at Carlson 
Cadillac before the same was purchased by Economy Auto. He saw the vehicle while at the Utah 
Auto Auction before the same was sold. Plaintiff communicated with and purchased the same 
through Hillcrest Service. 
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11. The condition of the vehicle did not change from the time the vehicle was seen at 
Carlson Cadillac until after the time the plaintiff purchased the same. 
12. The plaintiff had knowledge of this vehicle and general knowledge concerning 
vehicles and vehicle repair and was sophisticated in vehicle repair to the extent that he 
accomplished the majority of the repairs on the vehicle in question and had every opportunity to 
know the condition of the vehicle when he purchased the same. 
13. The court determines that the plaintiff does not have a cause of action under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-701, giving rise to potential misdemeanor criminal sanctions. 
14. Under the civil penalty provisions of Utah Code Ann. §41-3-702, the court does 
not believe that the provisions of subparagraph (1) apply to the facts and circumstances and 
allegations in this case. With respect to subsection (3)(c) which provides that: 
Fraudulently certifying that a damaged motor vehicle 
is entitled to an unbranded title, as defined in §41-
1A-1001, when it is not" 
The court determines that as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not misled or misrepresented to, 
nor did the defendants commit an act of "fraudulently certifying" as contemplated under §(3)(c) 
and therefore the court finds that there has been no civil violation and penalty under the 
aforementioned statute. 
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15. As a matter of law, the court concludes that there was no fiduciary relationship 
between the plaintiff and defendants and thus no cause of action could accrue under allegations of 
an alleged fiduciary relationship. 
16. The court concludes that the only issue remaining in the case is whether the 
alleged failure to supply a branded title and/or whether the vehicle qualifies and/or is required to 
have a branded title and that if so, whether such failure led to an alleged failure of the plaintiff to 
receive a manufacturer's warranty. To determine this issue, the defendants are granted leave to 
name as additional parties in this action the manufacturer, American General, the dealer, Carlson 
Cadillac, or such other entities as may be necessary and/or appropriate parties to determine the 
issue of whether the acts of the defendants have caused the plaintiff to allegedly not receive a 
manufacturer's warranty on the vehicle. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is 
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendants are 
granted partial summary judgment dismissing the claims of the plaintiff arising under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Utah's Consumer Sales Practices Act, and under Utah Code Ann. §41-3-
702(3)(c). The only claim against the defendants remaining is to the extent that there is a triable 
issue as between plaintiff and defendants whether defendants caused the plaintiff not to receive a 
manufacturer's vehicle warranty on the subject vehicle and what damages, if any, result from the 
same should there be a triable issue as to the vehicle's manufacturer's warranty. 
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Defendants are given leave to add as additional parties-defendant the vehicle 
manufacturer, American General, Carlson Cadillac, and such other individuals and/or entities as 
may be necessary to a determination of the issues pertaining to the manufacturer's vehicle 
warranty. 
DATED this /& day of-May: 1998. 
Y THE COURT. 
T^^se^e 
er F. Wilkinson 
istrict Court Judge 
-6-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this AO day of May, 1998, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order of Partial Summary Judgment was served on the following: 
Ray G. Martineau (By Hand Delivery) 
Anthony R. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
A. W. Lauritzen (By U.S.Mail) 
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto 
610 North Main 




Paul M. Belnap, #0279 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
American States Insurance Company 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES GORDON HOLMES, ) 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) 
AMERICAN STATES INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, a corporation; ) 
ECONOMY AUTO INC., a ) Civil No. 970900877CV 
corporation; and CLARENDON ) 
NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, ) 
a corporation, ) Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. ) 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on December 29, 1998 before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson with the parties appearing through their counsel of record. The 
matters before the court were Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant American 
States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Christopher Haderlie and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Reconsider the Order of Partial Summary Judgment dated June 10, 1998. 
The issues having been briefed by the parties as well as argued orally and the Court 
having considered the written memoranda and the oral arguments and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court determined that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted, American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Christopher 
Haderlie should be denied and Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider should be denied. 
1. With respect to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, the court reconsidered the 
pleadings and arguments made by counsel and affirms its prior order of June 10, 1998 believing 
that such ruling was correct. 
2. With respect to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, even if 
representations were made by individuals or entities other than these defendants that the 
manufacturer's warranty on plaintiffs vehicle was void, plaintiff has no cause of action against 
these defendants pertaining to the manufacturer's warranty on plaintiffs vehicle. 
4. With respect to American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Christopher Haderlie, the court feels that there is no cause of action against these 
defendants whether there was or was not a factory warranty on the vehicle, but the court has 
considered the affidavit and feels that such testimony could be admissible, but not relevant to a 
cause of action against these defendants and therefore denies the motion to strike. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is 
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HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is denied. The court affirms its ruling of June 
10, 1998. 
2. American States Insurance Company's Motion to Strike is denied. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the complaint of the 
plaintiff against the defendants is hereby dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant. 
DATED this day of Decemberr4#9«^ 
BY THE COURT: 
°A I 
Homer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Ray G. Martineau 
Anthony R. Martjaeau 
Attorneys for Plafinjiff 
A. WTLauritzen^ 
Attorney for Defendant, Economy Auto 
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